




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
Peace By Committee
Command and Control
Issues in Multinational Peace
Enforcement Operations

HAROLD E. BULLOCK, Major, USAF

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PEACE BY COMMITTEE

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Abstract

The United States has been involved in peace enforcement operations for many years. In that time we have learned some lessons. Unfortunately, we continue to repeat many of the same mistakes. Sometimes we have forgotten hard-learned lessons, and sometimes we never learned from our earlier experiences. The Dominican Republic deployment of 1965-66 and recent experiences under the Unified Task Force, Somalia (UNITAF) and United Nations Operations, Somalia II (UNOSOM II) are representative peace enforcement operations. This paper examines which lessons we learned from these operations, which lessons we learned and lost, and which lessons we seemingly ignored.

Focusing on command and control, the issues can be loosely grouped into categories of force and command structure, political impacts, and interoperability. In force and command structure, the US has not come to grips with the difficulties of operating in a multinational coalition under international (e.g., United Nations) control. The problems of dual lines of control and Byzantine command structures plagued both the Dominican and Somalia operations. The ability to integrate humanitarian relief and nation-building forces effectively into the overall structure has deteriorated rather than improved. Stand-by, earmarked forces, combined exercises (including nonmilitary agencies), and stronger civil-military integration cells could help mitigate difficulties, but they need to be pursued more vigorously.

Within the area of political impacts on peace enforcement operations, the subject of prisoners is still a difficult area with little progress being made in the last 25 years. Nations have also continued to place political constraints on their forces limiting them both geographically and operationally. In both cases, these constraints can not be eliminated, but they must be compensated for. Rules of engagement (ROE) also affect operations, and some progress has been made in this area. ROE for Somalia were aggressively designed from the bottom up and were well received. Work remains in the area of nonlethal force, but the US has made definite improvements in the process.

Finally, for a multinational peace enforcement operation to succeed, interoperability must be achieved. Equipment and logistics provide the most visible area of concern; and problems remain with equipment, fuels, and transportation and related skills. Difficulties among the geographically and culturally diverse forces in the Dominican Republic were repeated in Somalia. A related area, training and doctrine interoperability, seems less problematic. Though problems remain, the biggest challenge is underestimating the quality of the forces at first and overestimating their qualities later in protracted operations. Cultural and language interoperability overarches the other concerns and provides our biggest continuing challenge. Americans tend to be ethnocentric and mono-lingual, and our military system has done little to counter the associated problems. Education and training must be emphasized, and once multilingual and cultural skills are attained, these

attributes must be tracked and made available to both planners and commanders. Multilateral interoperability remains a challenge.

Overall, to improve command and control for multinational peace operations, we must look at past experiences, recognize the recurring problems, and aggressively attack the roots of those problems. This paper identifies some of the “stickiest wickets” from the Dominican Republic and Somalia and suggests some solutions. The solutions are not simple or easy, but if we ignore the problems, they will certainly not simply go away.

About the Author

Maj Harold E. ("Hal") Bullock is a communications/computer systems officer with a broad background, including space operations, strategic intelligence, and tactical communications. He has served under both Navy and Marine commands, the Det 2, Space Division (L. B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas), the Joint National Intelligence Development Staff (NAVINTCOM, Washington, D.C.), and the 2d Combat Communications Group, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. He holds Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Computer Science and is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, the Marine Corps Command and Control Systems Course, and Air Command and Staff College.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Although peacekeeping, and more recently, peace enforcement have attracted much attention in both the military and the media, the United States is no stranger to either. We have participated in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions at least as long ago as the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965–66. If recent missions in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia are any indication, the United States (U.S.) will likely continue as a key participant for the foreseeable future. As a recent Army briefing phrased it, the “U.S. will participate in both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in the coming decade—like it or not!”¹ By mid-1993 the United Nations had 80,000 personnel involved in peace operations across some 17 missions, and the 1993 United Nations (UN) peacekeeping budget totaled nearly \$3 billion.² Recent operations have shown that we learned some lessons from the past and improved in certain other areas, while in still other areas we either forgot or ignored what we learned in previous operations. I examine issues which affect our ability to conduct peace enforcement missions successfully. While the information presented may have wider application to peacekeeping or general coalition warfare, my focus is strictly on multinational peace enforcement operations.

Peace enforcement is fundamentally different from peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations are conducted with consent of all parties and are designed to supervise, not enforce, a truce already in place. These operations are described and authorized in chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter. Peace enforcement is much more demanding; it seeks to impose a peace with or without the consent of the belligerents. These operations are authorized in chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. Peace enforcement usually includes humanitarian and nation-building activities performed in a nonpermissive environment. I address peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping because of its greater military demands and because of its commensurably greater political sensitivities and constraints.

Specifically, this paper focuses on what I categorize broadly as command and control (C²). Under this umbrella I will examine issues relating to command structure and chain of command, political impacts on operational performance, and key interoperability areas. Although I deal specifically with interoperability issues in chapter 4, the idea of interoperability is pervasive. Whether in command structure, civil-military relationships, or national political impacts on operations, multinational interoperability is an overarching consideration.

I examine these areas in light of past and current actions using primarily the 1965 Organization of American States (OAS) operations in the Dominican Republic and recent US and UN actions in Somalia (Unified Task Force, Somalia (UNITAF) and United Nations Operations, Somali II (UNOSOM II), respectively). Illustrations from other operations will be used as appropriate. While not presented as complete case studies, these operations allow me to illustrate certain recurring themes.

These two operations are ideal for examining C² for peace enforcement. First, they give us a 25-year window to see what was learned, what was learned and forgotten, and what was never learned. Second, they have many common traits. Both included a number of mission changes and combinations, including peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and nation building. Both operations included US unilateral action and multilateral action under an organizational sponsor. In the Dominican Republic, this sponsor was the OAS, while in Somalia it was the UN. As in most peace operations, both were highly politicized and controversial, and were excellent laboratories for our discussion of multilateral C².

Of course it is fallacious to think of any operation entirely in the light of the past. Each mission is unique with its own ethnic, political, military, and logistical aspects, but certain factors seem to have a continuing relevance. When we are aware of past failures and successes, we increase our chances of successfully accomplishing the mission.

Although much could be written about the grand strategy of peace enforcement operations, I will focus on operational issues. I specifically want to shed light on problems encountered by military members executing the military mission. While I highlight problems and discuss possible solutions, I do not to lay blame but capture and preserve knowledge so hard-won and so easily lost.

How do we measure overall C² effectiveness? While difficult to statistically quantify, success requires forces to work effectively and efficiently within the political framework to accomplish political objectives while maximizing productivity of resources, both human and material. The following chapters systematically examine how command structure, political influences, and interoperability have affected the overall effectiveness of command and control in peace enforcement missions.

Notes

1. Briefing, Strategic Fellows, Chief of Staff of the Army, subject: "Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement," slide 35A, 6 January 1993.

2. Col Steven R. Rader, USA, *Strengthening the Management of UN Peacekeeping Operations: An Agenda for Reform* (Oslo, Norway: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier (IFS), 1994), 1.

Chapter 2

Command and Force Structure

The most important factor in a peace enforcement mission's success or failure is its command and force structure. Some past multilateral peace operations have been performed under the authority of regional organizations, but most (since 1945) have been under the United Nations (UN). Some have been single nation-led multilateral activities under the authorization (but not control) of the UN. A significant debate is currently underway with regard to the role of regional organizations in peace operations.¹ Some observers have suggested a greater role for regional organizations such as the European Community or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), citing the vested interest in peace such organizations have within their region. Other observers have pointed out the weaknesses and limitations of regional organizations.² Still, there appears to be a role for both UN and regional interests. This paper's two cases provide insight into this choice.

Both the Dominican and Somalian involvements are examples of multinational operations under international control which evolved from unilateral US actions. The Dominican Republic intervention transferred to the Organization of American States (OAS) control, while the Somalia mission was taken from UN control, operated as a US-led coalition (though under UN mandate), and ultimately returned to UN control.

The sections below address the issues involved in supranational command structures, discuss the dual lines of control in multinational forces, examine the decisions which guided the grouping and subordination of contingents, and examine the place of humanitarian organizations within the force structure. After analyzing our two example operations, I offer some observations and recommendations regarding multinational force structures under the control of the UN or designated regional organization.

Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic intervention was characterized by its commander (later deputy commander), Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, as "far more than just peace-keeping—it was *peace-making*"³ (emphasis in original). This peace-making mission—now termed "peace enforcement"—required endorsement and subsequent control by the OAS to remain politically viable in the

international community. To be successful, the local command had to be both responsive to OAS direction and efficient to accommodate force contingents from the US, Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.

Regional Versus United Nations Control

In the Dominican Republic crisis, the OAS was chosen over the UN for pragmatic reasons. In 1965 the world was near a height in cold-war tension. Against the backdrop of the Cuban missile crisis, and with the Communist revolution in nearby Cuba only a few years in the past, the prospect for another Communist takeover seemed likely. Since the UN Security Council included both China and the Soviet Union, intervention with the purpose of stopping a Communist revolution was unlikely. President Johnson wanted a multilateral effort to show widespread support for intervention but clearly wanted to keep the affair hemispheric.⁴ The advantage in using the OAS was US control. The OAS was a smaller group with largely anti-Communist views, and the US was clearly the leading nation. Dominican factions could also cooperate with the OAS without seeming to buckle under to US pressure. Interim Dominican leader General Imbert's first act of conciliation was to announce "full support of the OAS and proposed OAS-sponsored elections. . . ."⁵ He had previously been intransigent in dealing with the US as a unitary actor.

A relatively sympathetic OAS allowed the US to cover the mission with a peacekeeping cloak while pursuing an anti-Communist agenda. As Lieutenant General Palmer puts it,

I was told to take command of the US forces that were already there and those that come in and to prevent the Dominican Republic from becoming a second Cuba, and even more potentially dangerous, another Vietnam. Stabilize the situation and keep undesirable elements out of there. That was *really* what the mission was. It was never stated in writing and in that kind of language. It was put in more diplomatic language, more acceptable to the OAS.⁶ (emphasis in original)

The OAS provided a way to accomplish the missions of ensuring a stable, democratic government in the Dominican Republic (a goal most Latin governments shared), protecting the lives of US and other foreign nationals, and rebuilding the nation's infrastructure without having to work through a divided United Nations. On the other hand, the OAS involvement carried some liabilities. Against the recommendations of US ambassador to the Dominican Republic, W. Tapley Bennett, and Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, the OAS insisted all forces in the Dominican Republic come under OAS command and that those forces (the Inter-American Peace Force [IAPF]⁷) be commanded by a Latin American general. Brazilian Gen Hugo Panasco Alvim took command of the IAPF, and Palmer became his deputy.⁸

General Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to reassure Palmer by telling him the IAPF concept was simply a way to "legitimize our activities in world opinion by identifying them with the OAS."⁹ But the full impotence of the OAS was not that clear. Certainly the OAS shared the vision

of a stable, democratic Dominican government, but General Alvim was no figurehead. By Palmer's own account, he was a good commander and his own man, though the two leaders were usually able to reach a mutual agreement. While the US was driving overall policy, the OAS was fully engaged and refused to be a front for the United States. President Johnson was forced to walk a fine line between using overwhelming military pressure to stop a Communist takeover and bowing to OAS pressure for peaceful resolution through negotiation and compromise. After violent demonstrations throughout Latin America and OAS protests in the wake of 82d Airborne Division deployments, Johnson feared further landings would jeopardize his effort to transform the US venture into a multinational OAS enterprise.¹⁰

Meanwhile, the UN was not satisfied to remain a disinterested observer in the crisis. After an effort by the Soviet Union in the UN Security Council to derail US efforts and a long debate over OAS jurisdiction, the subject was seemingly settled by a personal letter from OAS President Mora to UN Secretary General U Thant explaining the crisis would be handled in-house, under the authority of the Organization for American States.¹¹ Further pressure for direct UN action were subject to US veto on the Security Council.

This act did not, however, prevent continuing UN involvement, and through official observer teams, the UN continued to make their presence felt throughout the crisis. The observers were characterized as "left-leaning" by Palmer, who accused them of rushing to send back the rebel ("Communist") side of every incident to New York without bothering to get the OAS side of the story.¹² To counter this UN interference, General Alvim, the Brazilian commander of the OAS forces, felt it occasionally necessary to show the UN that the OAS was in total control. On one occasion after the IAPF captured a rebel-held area in Santo Domingo, the UN observer team demanded its return to the rebels; Alvim refused both for tactical reasons and to show the UN it did not control the IAPF.¹³

The transition from US unilateral to OAS/IAPF command was eased by the fact that most high-ranking Latin officers had trained in the US and were familiar with US command structures. By assembling a staff made up of Latin Americans in several key staff billets with US deputies while other key staff were filled by US officers with Latin deputies, the transition went fairly smoothly. Most American scholars attribute this to real control remaining in the hands of Palmer and Ambassador Bennett.

OAS oversight worked fairly well for the Dominican intervention. In light of the evolution of the world situation over the last 30 years, the feasibility of control by regional organizations must be re-evaluated. I return to this issue in the chapter summary.

Multiple Lines of Control

The presence of dual lines of control complicates multinational operations and particularly those under control of an international organization. The OAS operation in the Dominican Republic was not free of this phenomenon.

Sovereignty and national interests are of prime importance to any troop contributor, and the seven nations who contributed forces to the IAPF were no exceptions.¹⁴ In multinational operations—and in peace operations in particular—leaders must handle conflicting guidance from various national command authorities and either resolve the conflicts or accommodate them.

In fact, dual lines of control were institutionalized in the authorizing document called “The Act Establishing the Inter-American Force.” Though forces remained under national command, they would

serve under the authority of the Organization of American States and [be] subject to the instructions of the Commander through the chain of command. Command of national contingents, *less operational control*, shall remain vested in the commanders of the respective national contingents.¹⁵ (emphasis added)

During the intervention, conflicting guidance from multiple official and unofficial command lines was frequent. General Palmer, deputy IAPF commander, characterized his commander, Brazilian General Alvim, as “a good leader and commander” who “ran the show” and definitely “not a rubber stamp.”¹⁶ Nonetheless, Alvim ran into trouble when he tried to exercise direct control over US forces. When faced with differences between Alvim’s desires and US intentions, the US answered with foot-dragging.¹⁷

General Palmer used the enormous US leverage gained by the one-sided troop ratio and logistics support to ensure the June 1965, IAPF regulations gave him wide latitude to act in the name of the commander. According to Palmer, he defined his own duties as deputy commander and used his influence and that of the US to work out any differences of opinion with General Alvim. Meanwhile Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who headed the three member “Ad-hoc Committee” which provided OAS guidance, used his influence similarly.

General Palmer and the US were aware Latin American contingents (including General Alvim, himself) were in regular communication with their respective national command authorities. In the days before cellular telephones and routine satellite communications, these conversations were routed through the US-monitored telephone system.¹⁸

The conflicts in national guidance also affected the US ability to use Latin troops. According to one US officer present, US forces were required to perform some actions unilaterally that the Latin Americans would not participate in.¹⁹ Despite these differences in national guidance, the forces seemed to work in surprising harmony. Palmer insisted that even though there were times he didn’t agree with General Alvim’s desires, “they always worked it out.”²⁰

This apparently amicable relationship can be attributed to two factors. First, the political guidance of the OAS was highly influenced by the US.²¹ Second the two leaders had compatible personalities. The men respected each other as professionals; although they disagreed on many occasions, the common respect they felt for each other helped smooth their differences.²² In the final analysis military operations often succeed or fail on the basis of

personalities. In this case Palmer and Alvim worked well together, but it was hardly something that could have been planned.²³

The IAPF command was apparently successful in working through and around conflicting national guidance to reach the desired end-state. Within the OAS, the vision of a free and democratic—or at least noncommunist—Dominican Republic was shared by the troop contributing states and made a common military goal possible. Even so, General Palmer was surprisingly vehement when he said the operation was the first to put US troops under command of the OAS and should “never again” be permitted to happen.²⁴ Despite General Palmer’s views, pressure continues for US troops to be placed under international command.

Grouping and Subordination

One of the most challenging tasks in creating any multinational command is structuring the force. When grouping and subordinating various national contingents, diverse units must be organized and used to maximize their capabilities while accommodating political restrictions or requirements. Frequently, contingent subordination and grouping is not decided by the combined force commander; he usually has the organization thrust upon him. This was certainly true of the OAS force in the Dominican Republic.

The overall guidance for the structure of the IAPF came through the act establishing the Inter-American Force. It outlined basic structure and put operational command of all troops under the OAS, through the IAPF Commander. The act further outlined a combined staff containing members from each contributing force.²⁵ Although the OAS authorized the commander to issue “force regulations” binding on all members of the force, it is unclear how he could enforce such regulations since UCMJ authority (or its equivalent) was not surrendered by the various nations.

In practice, the OAS guidance omitted many details of the structure. According to US Marine Corps historians, the commanders of each contingent were to work out directly among themselves and with the OAS the unified command structure and force composition.²⁶ However, Palmer and Ambassador Bennett were to “prepare recommendations as to [the] structure and functioning of [the] Unified Command and submit these to Washington for approval before commencing discussions with [Latin American] Force Commanders or the OAS Committee.”²⁷

In the early days of Operation Power Pack and Operation Press Ahead (the designation for the deployment of US and Latin contingents, respectively), the composition was not at all settled. After the final OAS vote on 6 May authorizing the deployment, Guatemala, Argentina, and Venezuela agreed to send contingents, but they later backed out. Many of the arriving Latin contingents gave little formal warning to US officials in Santo Domingo, including General Palmer, who had to accommodate the troops until a 22 May resolution could be passed, designating Brazil to provide the IAPF

commander. Palmer's designated successor, General Alvim, finally assumed command on 29 May 1965.

Ultimately, the force structure evolved along cultural lines. The troops from Paraguay, Honduras, and Nicaragua, along with the Costa Rican police detachment were grouped together into the "Fraternity Battalion." This battalion and the Brazilian forces were then formed into the Latin American Brigade under command of Col Carlos de Meira-Mattos of Brazil. The US and Latin forces rarely worked together. The Latin units were assigned independent missions and given "sectors of the perimeter" to man.²⁸ The number of trained, Spanish and Portuguese-speaking liaison officers needed to effect lower level coordination made combined operations below brigade level impractical.

All Latin Americans came under the control of the IAPF commander, while the US forces remained substantially under the command of General Palmer. As stated above, since the goals of the OAS and United States were close, and the personalities of the two senior leaders were compatible, this arrangement worked well. In a case where either the personalities or the politics are decidedly divergent, such success would be unlikely.

Humanitarian Organizations

Humanitarian relief organizations (HRO) must be included in any discussion of the force structure.²⁹ While not formally within the chain of command, humanitarian relief organizations were integral to the success of the Dominican intervention. As with almost every peace operation, the OAS mission included a significant humanitarian relief component.

Although there was no formally designated Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) in the Dominican Republic, the OAS did have a formal mechanism for orchestrating the various relief organizations' efforts. The OAS ad hoc committee—led by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker—provided on-scene strategic guidance to the IAPF.³⁰ The OAS coordinating committee, a civilian committee under the ad hoc committee, was responsible for all humanitarian efforts. The coordinating committee, composed of representatives of HRO active in the relief effort, met daily for the first few weeks of the crisis to sort out missions and priorities. The committee coordinated the feeding of over 40,000 families, orchestrated medical care in cooperation with the Pan American Health Organization and the Red Cross, and involved itself in civic efforts as diverse as water purification, insect control, garbage collection, and burials.³¹

Although the OAS formal report does not mention military involvement in relief efforts, such missions occupied much of their daily routine. Marines guarded USAID workers and protected OAS and HRO food stocks from looters.³² Army helicopters transported Inter-American Human Rights Commission authorities, and distributing food occupied a significant portion of the IAPF's time.³³ The daily coordination between the HRO and the military was largely accomplished through US Army civil affairs teams from

the 42d Civil Affairs (CA) Company. They worked with USAID and CARE to open elementary schools and with private agencies and USAID to coordinate the food distribution program.³⁴ However, one of the military's primary lessons was to turn operations over to "normal welfare agencies" as soon as possible.³⁵

One of the problems cited by the 42d CA Company demonstrates that civil-military coordination was not all it should have been. Often, once the situation was safe enough for civilian relief agencies and Dominican authorities to resume services in a given area, they did so without informing military relief workers, thereby duplicating effort unnecessarily.³⁶ Closer civil-military relationships would have significantly increased efficiency. Nevertheless, the overall relief mission can be rated as very successful.

Relief agencies also helped with the military mission. Although later described by General Palmer as "pathetically" naive in political outlook, he credited the Peace Corps with helping the IAPF deal with the left-leaning Dominican Catholic Church, which held great influence in Constitutionalist-held areas.³⁷ In another example, the Red Cross brokered the first successful cease-fire (after failures by US and OAS diplomats) on 21 May 1965.³⁸

The biggest complaint by General Palmer about HRO workers seemed to be with their political views. Many relief workers held liberal views and sympathized with the antigovernment rebels. The military favored the Dominican government and army—the opposing faction. This tension is visible in the exasperation of General Palmer who described Peace Corps members as "basically good people responding to a lot of suffering, but [who] didn't understand why the US was there" and didn't understand they would all be dead if the military had not arrived.³⁹

Despite this tension, the OAS coordinating committee, civil affairs specialists, infantry soldiers, and Marines seemed to work well together. As a result, the Dominican infrastructure was back in working order by the time elections were held the following year. The lessons are basic: Including humanitarian efforts requires cooperation and flexibility (politically and structurally). Diverse humanitarian agencies must also be willing to work together and submit to an oversight committee if relief efforts are to have any hope of success. In the Dominican Republic, this will to cooperate existed, though it was strained at times. Planning to incorporate relief agencies in the force structure paid off. Starvation and disease epidemics were averted, the infrastructure was reconstructed, and the shaky Dominican government which emerged in 1966 had a viable society to govern. In a peace enforcement operation, that can be counted as real success.

Somalia

Reviewing recent operations in Somalia, the structure of that multinational peace enforcement operation presents additional, important lessons. The force and command structure in Somalia was unusual in that the mission flowed

from a traditional, UN chapter 6 peacekeeping operation (UNOSOM I) into a US-led coalition under chapter 7 (peace enforcement) UN sanction (UNITAF), to a UN-controlled chapter 7 operation (UNOSOM II). I limit my discussion to the force structure under UNITAF and its transition to UNOSOM II. As in OAS operations in the Dominican Republic, the command structure had to facilitate responsiveness to the governing political authority and efficiently accommodate a wide range of multinational forces.

United Nations Versus Regional Control

UNITAF took over from UNOSOM I, an organization characterized by a senior UNITAF commander as “incapable of executing the Somalia mission and virtually immobilized by UN bureaucracy and chapter 6 rules of engagement,”⁴⁰ and this “immobilization” was an impetus for the US-led UNITAF. The United Nations needed a self-sustaining, overwhelming force to intimidate the armed factions in Somalia and allow the humanitarian relief to reach the starving. This goal was endorsed by many Americans, and on the heels of Desert Storm, America seemed ideally positioned to perform the mission. Even within the coalition force it demanded,⁴¹ the US could provide the sorely needed decisive command. The US deliberately limited its mandate to providing security for the relief effort and the coalition members themselves and sought an early end to military involvement. UN Security Council Resolution 794—crafted largely by the US—laid out very limited objectives to be reached, leaving the nation-building to the UN.

In the Dominican Republic, a regional organization took over and performed the role of peace enforcement and nation building. Would that have worked in Somalia? The short answer is no, for a number of reasons. One candidate, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is financially limited and would have been unable to field or maintain the forces necessary for the operation even if it could have reached political consensus on the mission.⁴² ECOWAS action in Liberia—dominated by Nigeria—has been particularly bloody, and overall performance has received mixed reviews at best.⁴³ Other regional organizations have equally weak or nonexistent military capabilities. Though the UN Charter does provide for the involvement of regional organizations under UN sanction, no other organization in the region could do the job.⁴⁴

A major argument against regional organizations involves the issue of impartiality. Hostility and “bad blood” go back centuries in the Horn of Africa region. Some Somalis still talk of Greater Somaliland,⁴⁵ and though relations have recently improved with Kenya and Ethiopia, most Somalis feel racially and ethnically superior to their neighbors who would likely have been ill-received as peace enforcers. The Somalis’ racial superiority complex does not extend to white Europeans and Americans, whom they consider equals.

Though a regional organization was unable to assume the entire mission, they have had a continuing role in the overall peace mission. Major General Zinni, UNITAF J-3, cited the OAU involvement as arbiters and particularly


highlighted the contributions of Ethiopia and Eritrea in setting up dialog among warring clan leaders.⁴⁶ A State Department official singled out the contributions of the Horn of Africa Committee for similar diplomatic efforts.⁴⁷ Regional organizations have a vested interest in seeing peace in their region. Even hostile neighbors are interested in keeping regional conflict contained and in stemming the economically devastating flow of refugees caused by an intrastate conflict. In Somalia, the regional organizations, weak though they are, are making an important and continuing contribution. As one military advisor at the UN recently put it, "regional organizations can play a role—and you certainly don't want them against you."⁴⁸

Regional organizations could not, however, perform the total mission, and the US chose not to remain indefinitely engaged. UN involvement was the only long-term option, eventually taking over in May 1993. However, some insist the deck was stacked against UNOSOM II from the beginning. The US was anxious to leave, feeling they had accomplished their limited objectives, but the UN was far from ready to receive the baton. The US, which had planned for a five or six weeks mission when it agreed to head UNITAF, was ready to turn over the command by mid-January.⁴⁹ As the UNITAF commander was able to assign humanitarian relief sectors (HRS) to non-US forces, he began—with the approval of CINCCENT and the JCS—to reduce US forces and redeploy them to their home bases. (fig. 1.) In his words, General Johnston "knew his mission had been accomplished" and was waiting for the UN to assume the greater mission formally.⁵⁰ However, Resolution 814 authorizing UNOSOM II was not passed until late March, and the first staff members were not in place and ready to start the transition until April.

To say the joint task force staff was frustrated with the process is an understatement. Already far behind their expected departure, General Johnston agreed to a six-week transition with dual staffs, but most of the UNOSOM II staff had still not arrived even by mid-May.⁵¹ He voiced frustration, saying, "the UN has known for eight months they're coming to Somalia and there's still no game plan." He later termed the take-over "inept." Had it not been for the quick addition of a handful of top-quality US Army officers to the UNOSOM II staff, the hand-off would have been even more difficult.⁵²

Other officials saw it differently. Walter Clarke, deputy to the US Special Envoy to Somalia, and Col Bruce Clarke, US Army expert on end-state planning, agreed the US had selected success criteria in Somalia which were hopelessly narrow. Even when met, these criteria were an insufficient starting point for UNOSOM II to have any hope of success.⁵³ The US refused to disarm the factions unless they presented a direct threat to either relief workers or the UNITAF forces themselves. Nor did the US want to undertake any sort of systematic nation building.⁵⁴ This was left to UNOSOM II which had neither the resources nor the unity of effort to do the job. An Australian military advisor to the UN pointed out the ambiguity of Resolution 814 which some nations, such as Italy, took to be a peaceful mandate and who refused to participate in the subsequent military operations to pacify warring clans.⁵⁵

All observers seem to agree that the hand-over to UNOSOM II was muddled and incomplete. The UN was under enormous pressure to assume an unfamiliar chapter 7 role and the US commander was under pressure to terminate what he saw as a successful UNITAF mission. Regardless of blame, clearly the UN was unready to assume command of the mission long after US



Source: Mr Walter Clarke

Figure 1. Map Showing Humanitarian Relief Sectors (Deployment Zones)

forces were ready to transfer it to them. The major problems can be loosely grouped into the categories of organization and policy.

Organizationally, the UN lacked a sufficient C³ structure—either in New York or in a deployable staff element. Both UN Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright and President Clinton have cited the need for a true “Command Center” in the New York headquarters, staffed by competent, experienced staff who can make command decisions.⁵⁶ The fact that, until recently, no one staffed the UN peacekeeping office past normal duty hours has been well publicized. Saying the UN closes down after 5 P.M. is an exaggeration, but it is true that getting a decision after hours is still difficult.

Major General Zinni among others has said that the UN needs a standing or stand-by deployable headquarters staff which would perform much like a CINC’s staff with similar authority to command and control UN military operations. Such a staff should have immediate access to the command center in New York, and in turn, direct access to the secretary general.⁵⁷ This would have eliminated or significantly reduced the waiting to “spin up” the UNOSOM II headquarters. Instead, the C³ transition plan was still being created after the JTF transition to UNOSOM II had occurred.⁵⁸ A deployable headquarters should also be backed by stand-by forces earmarked by their nations for UN deployment. These forces would regularly exercise with the UN staff and with each other in realistic scenarios. Ambassador Albright listed the lack of such a robust military force as one of the failures of the UN in Somalia.⁵⁹

Multiple Lines of Control

Procedurally, command lines are still muddled. While sovereignty dictates it and the UN Charter recognizes it, and nations retain authority over their deployed forces, a more streamlined command methodology must be found. One of the biggest problems with UNOSOM II was the three chains of command to the US forces in theater.

UN commander, General Bir, held some authority for action. General Montgomery, Bir’s deputy and senior US officer, answered to both Bir and to Admiral Howe, the secretary general’s special representative. While Admiral Howe was a UN official, he was also an American who was hand-picked for the job. When Bir and Howe disagreed, it put General Montgomery in a difficult spot. To make matters worse, after the ambush of the Pakistani on 5 June and subsequent decision by Howe to go on the offensive, all missions by the Army Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in Somalia had to be approved by USCENTCOM headquarters in Florida. The QRF was not actually under UN control, but was to be available on-request from UNOSOM II, through General Montgomery. However, after 5 June Montgomery was basically cut out of the QRF control.⁶⁰ Thus, US forces had to contend with three heads: General Bir, Admiral Howe, and USCENTCOM. The added complication of the contingent forces’ national commands made the entire operation almost hopeless from a command and control perspective.

In fact, after the shooting began in earnest, General Bir's control in Mogadishu was severely tested. The Italians, Pakistanis, and Moroccans drew into defensive postures and refused to man road blocks, patrol, or operate at night.⁶¹ The Pakistanis even went as far as to make "back room deals" with General Aideed's forces for safe passage through UNOSOM areas.⁶²

Even during UNITAF, dual lines of command caused significant problems for Lieutenant General Johnston. While some contingents such as the Australians and Canadians had fairly broad authority from their governments, others like Saudi Arabia had to check with their national command authority before each action. This forced the JTF headquarters to employ the Saudis only in missions which could be pre-planned. Other nations were bound by their governments to "nonheroic" missions and could only be used with great restrictions on their movement.⁶³

Dual lines of control are an inherent problem of multinational operations, but to minimize the impact, the overall scope of the operation must be outlined to the contributors and agreed to in advance. Contributing nations should openly outline employment restrictions before the operation is committed, and the UN headquarters must be willing to set certain requirements for participation. Furthermore, dramatically changing the operation's mandate—even if unavoidable—requires consultation with the troop supplying governments. This type of negotiation will probably require a significant amount of time which must be expected. Standby forces, a standing headquarters staff, and combined UN exercises will go far to minimize confusion and shorten the planning cycle. But when it is time to commit troops, the employment negotiations will still take time. Anyone expecting the UN (or any other multinational body) to work quickly is due for a disappointment.

Grouping and Subordination

With all the caveats on how the various contingents could be employed, it was even more important to organize them to maximize their capabilities within political limitations. In UNITAF, the task of organizing and subordinating the units became largely a negotiation between the supplying governments and the JTF staff. This was especially trying since, in the words of Lieutenant General Johnston, "the politicians, diplomats did not . . . really have a game plan for who the coalition members are [sic] going to be."⁶⁴ By the time UNOSOM II took over, the relationship was largely geographic with each humanitarian relief sector (HRS) under a contingent force and each HRS reporting directly to the UNOSOM II staff. It is useful to look at the UNITAF model because most lateral relationships among contingents were worked out in that phase, and no contingents were added for UNOSOM II.⁶⁵

The troop contributors were initially divided into two basic groups: those who were self-sustaining and able to operate independently, and the

contingents who were either too small to operate alone or had inadequate logistics to do so. For some larger units and all the smaller ones, the initial screening for assignment location, subordination, and capability fell to an ad hoc unit called the Coalition Forces Support Team (CFST). The CFST began as a totally Marine-staffed unit, with a few Army members added later to give it a joint flavor. The CFST worked with advanced teams or national headquarters to establish the logistical, operational, and geographic parameters under which a contingent force would operate. Based on what they would do politically and what they could do logistically and militarily, the units were assigned. A key part of the assignment process concerned unit subordination. Some contingents—the Italians in particular—insisted they work directly for the JTF commander, while others were satisfied to be employed as seemed most appropriate.⁶⁶

All brigade-size or larger units were placed either directly under the JTF commander or the ARFOR commander, Major General Arnold. Italian, French, and Canadian forces reported directly to Johnston, while the Australian and later Belgian and Moroccan forces worked well for Arnold. Even some of the larger national contingents had severe restrictions. The Belgians, who had an internal agenda to work with one of the HRO, Doctors Without Borders, insisted they be assigned to Kismayo.⁶⁷ Nations that provided theater airlift loosely subordinated their airlift forces under the US Air Force, while nations who could only service their own contingents kept their transport under national command.⁶⁸

Most smaller units were unable to leave the area immediately around the airport, either because of logistics shortfalls (for example, lack of vehicles), or unwillingness to work in the riskier areas. These limitations caused them to fall under a succession of battalion commanders, eventually ending with Lieutenant Colonel Lesnowicz, commander of 3d Battalion, 11th Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Lesnowicz ultimately commanded a collection of units equivalent to a reinforced mechanized regiment (five battalion equivalents and nine nationalities).⁶⁹ The happenstance manner in which Lieutenant Colonel Lesnowicz came to command this diverse assembly makes it even more impressive that it seemed to work so smoothly with so few incidents. When one of Lesnowicz's superiors apologized for "dumping" all the small, third-world units on him, Lesnowicz bristled, replying that he was honored to have those units under his command.

In addition to the issue of the subordination and geographic assignment of the contingents, just getting them to Somalia was a challenge. The US was tasked—often on very short notice—to airlift most contingents. However, since UN airlift requirements were factored into the time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD), US airlift was not impacted by the foreign demands. Air Mobility Command (AMC) did get welcome assistance from British and New Zealand airlifters, but most of the burden fell to US Air Force C-5s and C-141s. According to AMC officials, their biggest overall challenge was lack of fuel and ramp space at Mogadishu.⁷⁰

Humanitarian Organizations

In peace operations, humanitarian efforts play a major role. Resources and organizations outside the normal command structure should be used efficiently to meet the inevitable humanitarian needs.

Even more than in the Dominican Republic crisis, peace enforcement in Somalia was overshadowed by the work of the humanitarian relief sector. Major General Zinni, UNITAF J-3, put the number of HRO at 60 with 518 separate facilities, while the Center for Army Lessons Learned puts the number of HRO at more than 80.⁷¹ To improve the efficiency of the relief agencies, the UN set up a humanitarian operations center (HOC). Its stated purpose was to coordinate the efforts of all HRO, reduce duplication of effort, and provide a forum for discussion and resolution of common problems.⁷² Recognizing the difficult mission of the HOC, the UN hired CARE president Phil Johnson to head it. Referred to as the "backbone of the HOC," Johnson was an aggressive leader who did his best to coordinate overall strategy for the HRO.⁷³ To augment the HOC, a civil military operations center (CMOC) was set up to coordinate military convoy-escort duties and serve as a liaison between the armed forces and the HRO. Unfortunately, illness forced Johnson to leave Somalia, and his absence created a tremendous void no one was willing to fill. According to Major General Zinni, the CMOC was forced to step in and take over most of the HOC's coordination and integration function.⁷⁴

Fortunately, recent experience in northern Iraq had given USCENTCOM, and Major General Zinni in particular, valuable experience in operating a CMOC. Col Kevin Kennedy, Operation Provide Relief chief of staff, also brought valuable experience to the table. Because of his familiarity with the area and the HRO, he was selected to head the JTF CMOC.⁷⁵ Still, the unfamiliarity of the average military person with the HOC and vice versa created considerable confusion. While not entirely avoidable, this unfamiliarity and distrust could have been reduced by including HRO in previous exercises. An exercise held by the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1st MEF) using an Ethiopian scenario excluded all relief agencies, even though originally proposed by the exercise creators.⁷⁶

In addition to the military's ignorance, the HRO were unfamiliar with, and in many cases, unaware of other HRO doing similar jobs. These organizations, staffed in many cases with idealistic personnel, resented regimentation and often distrusted the military. While the CMOC did a good job as a clearinghouse for information, it was not authoritative and could not compel cooperation. As one Army battalion commander put it, "The [HRO] did a lot of good things, but [were] not under control."⁷⁷

Even coordination between UN organizations such as the UN High Commission on Refugees, the World Food Program, and the UN Development Program and the military left much to be desired. The coordination was so bad that when these organizations were restricted for security reasons from entering certain zones of Mogadishu, the organizations continued to carry out their tasks, totally unaware of their restrictions or the danger.⁷⁸

The military quickly recognized the need to organize relief, but made the mistake of mirror-imaging. Treating the situation much like an intelligence problem, they made it an essential element of information to find the mandate, political philosophy, and chain of command for each group. Unfortunately, they found that many groups were splintered and had no recognizable chain of command. Many of the organizations were manned by "green" recruits even more confused about their environment and mission than was the military.⁷⁹

There were, however, some bright spots. The idea of using an intelligence framework for gathering information on HRO had some merit. Brig Gen Lawson Magruder, deputy ARFOR commander, recommended getting the HRO "order of battle" to find out about capabilities, personalities, and areas of responsibility. He felt this information to be of primary importance in a peace enforcement mission like Somalia.⁸⁰ The 10th Mountain Division learned relief to set up the military boundaries to correspond to civilian agency zones during hurricane Andrew.⁸¹ This at least limited the number of HRO a given military unit had to work with. The best relationships were built when a military unit could build a one-to-one relationship with an HRO and form a sense of mutual understanding.

Another positive lesson was the use of the Army's Movement Control Center (MCC), a unit of the Corps Support Command. Regardless of political or religious orientation, all HRO were interested in effectively moving their relief convoys. The MCC approaches directly enhanced HRO aid distribution, and their services were soon highly sought after. The MCC served as a "foot in the door" for further cooperation between civilian and military organizations.⁸² Marine forces set up their own CMOC, and though originally strictly limiting their focus to convoy protection, they quickly expanded their role. They began distributing food, and even set up civil (Somali) police forces and organized local government councils. They worked alongside the HRO not only to help the people of Somalia but also to lessen the threat to themselves by becoming "valuable" to the Somalis.⁸³

The humanitarian effort was plagued by the need for protection. Though the US forces agreed to protect convoys, they were unable to provide continuous protection for the multitude of workers and installations throughout Somalia. Walter Clarke, deputy to the US special envoy, attributed this lack of military protection to General Johnston's reluctance to enlarge the mission. He specifically cited a refusal in March 1993 to deal with direct threats by Somali "thugs" to kill ICRC and CARE officials if they would not pay \$500,000 in "back wages."⁸⁴ Most military officials, however, attribute the lack of comprehensive security to UNITAF's narrow mandate and the impracticality of guarding the vast number of personnel and installations within the HRO establishment.

In any case, the HRO took matters into their own hands, perpetuating a necessary evil which continually plagued both UNITAF and UNOSOM II. This was the use of Somali "bodyguards." General Johnston phrased the dilemma directly, "How do you disarm [Somalia] without disarming the

[non-governmental organizations] or providing a security umbrella?”⁸⁵ To answer the problem of controlling the armed Somali HRO guards, the military came up with a series of weapon-authorization cards. After a failed first attempt using generic “pink cards,” they settled on blue ID cards carrying photos of an HRO worker (not a Somali) (fig. 2). The worker with the card could vouch for any guards in his or her company.⁸⁶ While this solved the problem of independent, gun-carrying Somalis claiming to be “guards,” many problems remained. Though the cards limited guards to small arms, many HRO guards continued to carry heavy weapons such as crew-served machine guns. These were routinely confiscated.⁸⁷ It is easy to speculate that at least some workers, already fearful for their lives, were pressured into being “guarded” and served as unwilling covers for Somali bandits.

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ORGANIZATION IDENTIFICATION CARD	
Name:	No:
ORGANIZATION:	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; text-align: center;"> PLACE PICTURE HERE </div>
Relief Sector:	
Issued By:	
Expires:	
Signature:	Date:
<p>The bearer of this card is an official employee of a Humanitarian Relief Organization and is authorized to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct humanitarian operations in the UTF area of operations - Enter Mogadishu Port, Mogadishu Airport, and other UTF facilities as required to perform humanitarian relief operation. Weapons policy aboard UTF bases and facilities is subject to restrictions imposed by military authorities. - travel with Somali security personnel temporarily employed by the HRO not possessing identification cards. the temporary security may be armed with authorized weapons (rifles; assault rifles, shotguns, and pistols). - Pass through UTF roadblocks and checkpoints during the hours of daylight without search or inspection upon presentation of the identification card and confirmation of the identity of the bearer. During the hours of darkness and periods of heightened security alert, vehicle searches will be conducted. 	

Source: UNITAF policy document, “Identification and Weapons Policy”

Figure 2. Weapon Authorization ID Card

One aid worker, Sean Devereaux, of Irish Concern, tried to demilitarize the HRO in Kismayo. He formed a kind of "board of directors" of the local relief agencies and through force of personality and determination, helped organize and coordinate their efforts. He even began to have some success in convincing local relief agencies to fire their Somali "protectors," but he was killed by his own former guards for his efforts. The incident sent a chill through the agencies, who quickly re-hired their guards. His loss set cooperative efforts back weeks.⁸⁸

The lack of overall coordination among humanitarian agencies and between HRO and the military significantly limited the overall success of UNITAF and later, UNOSOM II. Although one commander described the CMOC as "standing-room only every morning," packed with relief workers, it really had no ability to coordinate or control.⁸⁹ While its function as a clearinghouse for information was good, the CMOC and humanitarian operations center it supports must receive more attention in the future to become a true relief coordination center. The relief and nation-building efforts in a peace enforcement mission are more critical to lasting peace than any effort by the military to force a halt to fighting.

Summary

In studying the OAS command and force structure and that of UNITAF and UNOSOM II in Somalia, some recurring patterns emerge we can use to improve the chances for success in future peace enforcement operations. To have an effective multinational command, a viable political and military command structure is essential. One way to achieve this structure is to institute an organizationally sanctioned, US-led command structure to act as proxy to the multinational organization—the UNITAF model. However, this has begun breeding resentment among some non-US officers who fail to understand why the US "always has to be in charge."⁹⁰

A second option uses a true, integrated UN command, incorporating both political and military leadership. UNOSOM II was supposed to be such a command, but its failures point to the need for a standing UN military command headquarters staff with access to senior political leadership. As mentioned earlier, this command staff would need to be backed by designated, stand-by force contingents from troop-supplying nations, and these forces would need to exercise realistically with the headquarters staff on a regular basis. The UN is taking initial steps in this regard and has established a 24-hour situation center to maintain a link with field operations. They have also taken steps to expand the staff of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, adding additional political and military officers.⁹¹ These are good first steps, but to have any credibility as a command and control center, the other steps I've outlined need to be accomplished as well.

A third structural model employs a regional organization to command the peace operation. While successful in the Dominican Republic, this was a special case unlikely to be repeated in the future. First, the United States was a member of the OAS and was able to use cold war pressures to achieve unity in a small regional organization. The US dominated the organization militarily and politically, and its position in the UN Security Council allowed it to block interference by the UN. In the post cold war world, the UN is increasingly the sole empowering agency for peace operations. OAS sponsorship for peace operations has at least twice been rejected since 1965—in Nicaragua in 1979 and in Central America in 1990.⁹² While regional organizations should and will play a part in peace enforcement missions, it will likely be either in a diplomatic role or as a “sub-contractor” to the UN. NATO’s role in former Yugoslavia is a pertinent example. For a regional organization to be useful, its political goals must be compatible with the UN, especially if a UN resolution is in effect. While accountability to the UN might be loose, it will be real.

Having a capable command does not totally eliminate the problem of dual lines of control from the UN and from the contingent’s national government. It does, however, provide a framework for working through many issues of sovereignty before they become a life-or-death matter. US doctrine does little to resolve this dilemma, when on the same page of FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, it says both “the UN commander normally has operational control” and “the US commander will retain full command authority.” It goes on to say that the command relationship between US forces and international organizations will be “subject to mutual resolution.”⁹³ True, but hardly helpful. The only way to work through these command authority issues is by creating a true UN command structure and conducting exercises to refine it.

Issues surrounding sovereignty and the reluctance of nations to create a supranational command make the creation of a UN military headquarters difficult. Even if a standing UN headquarters could be implemented, there would probably still be strong resistance to turning full command of national forces over to UN command. Even so, the creation of a standing headquarters unit would eliminate much of the time currently required to name a commander and assemble and train a staff each time a crisis arises.

The final composition of such a UN command headquarters would have to be somewhat flexible, of course. Col Pedro Colmenares, a veteran of UN Operations in El Salvador (ONUSAL), points out that the need to preclude officers from holding important positions who are from countries with “profound differences” with other countries in the force. Colmenares also maintains the staff should be truly representative of the contingents involved, unlike the one-sided UNITAF model.⁹⁴ Despite the colonel’s concern, a force from predominantly developing nations is unlikely to have sufficient large-scale logistics or command experience to successfully conduct or control a large operation.

In coordinating the humanitarian relief efforts, both the Dominican and Somalia operations highlight the need for closer relations among

humanitarian agencies, the sponsoring political organization (UN or OAS), and the military. Civil affairs personnel played a large role in the Dominican Republic in trying to maintain this link. While not entirely successful, they and the OAS coordinating committee had significant success in coordinating the relief and rebuilding effort. Official agencies such as USAID were also very helpful in the Dominican Republic. Major General Zinni has stressed the need for USAID and their Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance to play a larger role. Their Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) are a big help to any agency and should have a major part in the CMOC and in helping the operations and plans directorates as a special staff.⁹⁵

One way to bring about closer HRO-military relations has already been mentioned—their involvement in joint and combined exercises. To build trust, these exercises may initially be strictly humanitarian relief scenarios—for example, a hurricane or flood relief mission. Later, peace enforcement exercises should be included. The military cannot expect to work as well with agencies and individuals who have had no contact with the military until a real situation develops. One imaginative measure the Dutch have taken is to create a one-week course in their UN Training Centre for journalists. This helps foster understanding between the two communities and is popular among journalists.⁹⁶ A similar training course in our professional schools for humanitarian agencies should pay big dividends.

To improve the command and force structure for the next peace enforcement mission we must begin now. The answers outlined here are not comprehensive, but are a starting point. Peace enforcement is unfortunately a growth industry. We cannot afford to continue doing business as usual if we expect success in the next mission.

Notes

1. Dr James S. Corum, Maj, USAR, "The UN and American Experience in Peace Enforcement" (Paper presented at the International Studies Association (South) Conference, October 1993) presents an argument for greater involvement of regional organizations, offering Liberian operations by the West African States as an example of bloody, but effective intervention. Jack Child, "Peacekeeping and the Inter-American Military System" (Paper presented at conference on Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Coalition Warfare: the Future Role of the United Nations, Norwich University, Northfield, Vt., 24–25 February 1994), offers strong arguments against independent regional organization involvement, advocating United Nations operations instead.

2. Ambassador Alexander Borg-Olivier, "The UN in a Changing World Order: Expectations and Realities" (Address to the conference on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, 24 February 1994. Ambassador Borg-Olivier points out that the real or perceived interests of regional organizations within their area may preclude objectivity and/or even-handedness, and therefore severely impair their ability to conduct peace operations effectively. In a 21 March 1994 interview with the author, Mr Walter Clarke, deputy to US special envoy, Robert Gosende, added that most regional organizations are financially and organizationally unequipped to conduct significant peace enforcement operations. While this may be overcome through outside financial backing, it remains a significant hurdle.

3. Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, untitled address to Pan-American Society of New England, Boston, Mass., 27 October 1966.

4. Dr Lawrence A. Yates, *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966*, Leavenworth Papers, no. 15 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 77.

5. Cable, American Embassy, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic to US State Department, *Evening SITREP For the President*, 9 May 1965.

6. Gen Bruce Palmer, Bruce Palmer papers, oral history, 152.

7. The force was initially called the Inter-American Armed Force, shortened to Inter-American Force, and finally called the Inter-American *Peace* Force or IAPF.

8. Yates, 149-50.

9. *Ibid.*, 150.

10. *Ibid.*, 91.

11. Dr Alfred M. Pollard, "The Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965: The Role of International Law in United States Decisionmaking" (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1980), 111.

12. Palmer oral history, 190.

13. Yates, 159.

14. Contributors (not including the US): Brazil (1,130), Honduras (250), Paraguay (184), Nicaragua (160), Costa Rica (21 security police), and El Salvador (3 staff officers).

15. Yates, 150.

16. Palmer oral history, 184.

17. Col Steven M. Butler, USA, (Ret.), telephone interview with author, 19 January 1994. In his interview, Colonel Butler cited a surprising parallel to recent intervention in Somalia. General Alvim and the OAS wanted the IAPF to disarm the rebel faction; the US successfully resisted this by stonewalling and being generally uncooperative, while never actually bringing it to open confrontation. Another incident of "non-unity" appears in the Command Diary, S-1 Log of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 7 May 1965. The IAPF was ordered by the OAS to receive arms surrendered by the rebels as a result of a broadcast plea for reconciliation by the newly appointed interim president, General Imbert. The Marines manning the roadblocks where the arms surrenders were to occur were informed through US channels to beware of deception and to "cooperate, but not participate [in] receipt of weapons. . . ."

18. Palmer oral history, 184.

19. Butler interview. An example is the incident at the Hotel Matúm. A large group of Constitutionlists, led by Colonel Camaño had ventured to the interior town of Santiago. While eating breakfast at the hotel, they were attacked by 300 Loyalists troops and a bloody gun battle ensued. The IAPF was forced to separate the two groups, but Latin American forces refused to take part. Provisional President Godoy also wanted to use the IAPF for both civic action and internal security. The Latin Americans, fearing their actions would be seen as too supportive of the Godoy administration, were *extremely* reluctant to perform any internal security functions. Instead, the US forces formed (also reluctantly) a "reaction force" to quell civil unrest and ensure a peaceful environment for elections.

20. Palmer oral history, 184.

21. The US created an acrimonious atmosphere early in the crisis by sending McGeorge Bundy to secretly negotiate between the two Dominican factions without the knowledge of the OAS. When the negotiations failed and became public knowledge, the initial OAS guidance committee (which had no American member) resigned in protest. This worked to US advantage when a subsequent triumvirate called simply the "Ad hoc Committee" was formed to provide strategic guidance to the IAPF. This new OAS committee was headed by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and reflected a US vision.

22. Another factor enhancing the compatibility was the strong positive feelings toward the US among those senior Brazilian officers who had served in Italy during World War II. General Alvim was one.

23. It can be argued that personality conflicts can be somewhat reduced by demanding highly professional officers be provided for leadership positions, though the example of the legendary conflicts between Montgomery and Patton and between Lee-Mallory and Spaatz during World War II show that even among professionals, tremendous friction can arise. Many

conflicts are due to widely diverging personal or corporate agendas which may be quite different from a "rational unitary actor" view of the operation. For more on this, see Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision*.

24. Quoted by Butler in his telephone interview.

25. OAS, *Report of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States Regarding the Dominican Situation* (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, n.d.), 13. (Original in Spanish)

26. Maj Jack K. Ringler, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., *U.S. Marine Corps Operations in the Dominican Republic April-June 1965* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, USMC, 1970), 58.

27. Yates, 149.

28. Butler, telephone interview with author.

29. HRO can be divided into supergovernmental relief organizations such as the UN International Children's Emergency Fund, governmental organizations such as the Peace Corps and US Agency for International Development (USAID), and non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as CARE and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

30. According to OAS, 23, the members were Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker (USA), Chairman, Ambassador Ilmar Mirinho (Brazil), and Ambassador Ramó Dueñas (El Salvador).

31. OAS, 50. Initially these tasks fell to the U.S. military which was unprepared for such duty.

32. Command Diary, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 28 April-9 June 1965, 7.

33. Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, draft manuscript of untitled speech to Association of the US Army (never presented), October 1965, 13.

34. According to OAS, 51, over 27.5 million pounds in May and June alone.

35. Yates, 135-36; and OAS, 51.

36. Yates, 136.

37. Palmer oral history, 176.

38. Yates, 117.

39. Palmer oral history, 176.

40. Lt Gen Robert Johnston, USMC, correspondence with author, 3 May 1994.

41. According to Maj Gen Anthony C. Zinni, we required three regional countries (need not be African) and three African countries (need not be regional).

42. Walter E. Clarke, interview with author, 23 March 1994.

43. Col Gary W. Anderson, USMC, interview with author, 8 February 1994.

44. It is possible that with massive outside funding and logistical support, a regional organization might have been able to field a peace enforcement force. The US provided millions of dollars in aid to Nigerian forces who led a brutal imposition of order in Liberia. Sufficient funding and support from the US, or perhaps the Arab League, may have made a regional solution possible. It is the opinion of the author that such a solution would have been highly unlikely for financial, cultural, and military reasons.

45. "Greater Somaliland includes the northern part of Kenya, the eastern part of Ethiopia, and all of Djibouti.

46. Maj Gen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, telephone interview with author, 14 February 1994.

47. Clarke interview.

48. Maj Stuart Jeffrey, Canadian Defense Forces, interview with author, 25 March 1994.

49. Capt David A. ("Scotty") Dawson, USMC, interview with author, 21 March 1994; and Clarke interview.

50. Johnston correspondence.

51. This apparent reluctance to staff the UNISOM headquarters stands in stark contrast to the chronic overstaffing and underemployed officers cited in a questionnaire response by Maj George Partington of the Ghanaian army, a veteran of UNEF (Sinai), UNIFIL (Lebanon), and UNTAC (Cambodia).

52. Johnston correspondence.

53. Col Bruce B. G. Clarke, interview with author, 23 March 1994; and Mr Clarke, interview with author.

54. Many participants in UNITAF have pointed out that although humanitarian actions and nation building were not systematically undertaken, they were pursued "on the margin" as time and opportunity permitted.

55. Col C. R. Prickett, Australian army, interview with author, 25 March 1994.

56. Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, "Building a Consensus on International Peacekeeping," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, 4, no. 46, 15 November 1993, 790; and President Bill Clinton, transcript of untitled address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 27 September 1993, 7.
57. Zinni interview.
58. Briefing, JTF Somalia, subject: "Joint Communication System Transition Plan for JTF/Joint Support Command," 27 January 1993.
59. Albright, 789, 790.
60. Lt Col William J. Martinez, USA, interview with author, 23 March 1994.
61. Martinez interview. Once the Pakistanis were issued armored cars, they began to resume their normal patrol duties.
62. Martinez interview; Anderson interview; and Lt Col Darrell Elmore, a senior US Army special forces officer, who served in Somalia during UNISOM II added during a 3 May 1994 briefing at SAAS that the Italian contingent routinely paid bribes to avoid problems with Somalis in their areas as well.
63. Dr Robert K. Wright, Major, USAR, telephone interview with author, 6 January 1994.
64. Johnston correspondence.
65. The JTF staff itself was composed almost entirely of US Marine Corps officers. While this may have been politically irritating, it made the staff coordination easier. The Center for Army Lessons Learned report, "Summary, Operation Restore Hope Army Forces Executive Summary," Tab B, 5, states, "joint staff meeting agendas [must] start at a more fundamental level than those conducted among staff officers sharing common SOPs." In working with the coalition, the JTF staff had to stress General Johnston's expectations and get detailed feedback to determine their coalition partners' abilities.
66. Dawson interview.
67. Capt David A. ("Scotty") Dawson, USMC, questionnaire response, 3 January 1994.
68. Dr Robert K. Wright, Major, USAR, interview with author, 22 March 1994.
69. Dawson questionnaire response.
70. Lt Col Charles Peterson, USAF, telephone interview with author, 3 May 1994. The lack of ramp space made it possible for only two aircraft at a time to be serviced or unloaded at the Mogadishu airport. This minuscule space was shared among JTF airlift, contingents' organic lift, humanitarian organizations' contract aircraft, and assorted miscellaneous aircraft such as news media and visiting dignitaries. The lack of fuel at Mogadishu forced aircraft to carry heavy fuel loads—diminishing their cargo loads—or fly circuitous routes through Kenya or Ethiopia.
71. Zinni interview; and Center for Army Lessons Learned, "The Military and Humanitarian Relief Efforts," n.d., 2.
72. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "The Military and Humanitarian Relief Efforts," n.d., 2.
73. Zinni interview.
74. Ibid.
75. Dawson interview. Note from author: Provide Relief was the humanitarian airlift mission done in parallel with UNISOM I. Far from being an afterthought, the CMOC was established on 5 December 1992, 4 days before the UNITAF D-Day.
76. Anderson interview.
77. Martinez interview; and Zinni interview.
78. Anderson interview. Colonel Anderson also related an incident where Army Rangers, hoping to capture Aideed or some of his lieutenants, mistakenly snatched a Canadian UNDP worker and several of his colleagues. When later questioned about why they were in a forbidden area, they said they had no idea they were not to be in that area of the city.
79. Wright interview.
80. Brig Gen Lawson Magruder, quoted by Dr Robert K. Wright in telephone interview with author, 9 January 1994.
81. Wright interview.
82. Ibid.
83. Dawson interview.
84. Clarke interview.

85. Johnston correspondence.
86. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, "The Military and Humanitarian Relief Efforts," 3; Dawson interview; and Unified Task Force, Somalia; "Identification and Weapons Policy," n.d., 1-3.
87. Dawson interview; and UTF, Somalia, 2.
88. Wright interview.
89. Lt Col Charles Borchini, USA, interview with author, 23 March 1994.
90. Col Nelson Gutierrez, Colombian army, questionnaire response, 25 January 1994; and Col Pedro Colmenares, Venezuelan army, questionnaire response, 14 January 1994.
91. Col Steven R. Rader, USA, *Strengthening the Management of UN Peacekeeping Operations: An Agenda for Reform* (Oslo, Norway: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier (IFS), 1994), 1.
92. Jack Child, "Peacekeeping and the Inter-American Military System" (Paper presented at Conference on Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Coalition Warfare: the Future Role of the United Nations, Norwich University, Northfield, Vt.), 24-25 February 1994), 11, 14.
93. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, 1994, 3-3.
94. Colmenares questionnaire response.
95. Zinni interview.
96. Briefing, Training Centre for UN Operations, Dutch army, subject: "Overview of Training Centre for UN Operations," n.d; and Ministerie van Defensie, "Background on the Training for Journalists Who Operate in Crisis Areas," n.d., 1-7. A section of the course particularly applicable to HRO training includes stress avoidance and management, the legal status in crisis areas, and rights if taken hostage or prisoner.

Chapter 3

Political Impacts on Operations

Although Clausewitz reminds readers that war is fundamentally political, military officers continue to be surprised and frustrated by political intervention in military operations. If war in general is political, we should expect coalition peace enforcement operations to be doubly so. In peace enforcement missions, the objective is not to defeat an enemy, though a faction may have to be forcibly restrained.¹ The objective of peace enforcement is to reconcile the warring sides to a lasting agreement. Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, commander of US forces in the Dominican Republic, said his mission was at least as much political as military.² So it is in every peace enforcement operation.

Peace enforcement missions usually require intervention in one or more nations' "internal affairs" with a third party force. These interventions are frequently multinational affairs with each participating nation having its own agenda. Even under UN or regional authority, troop contributors will have different views of the intervention and different objectives. Complicating matters further, the sponsoring organization will have its own agenda which may not mesh with that of any individual participant. These factors combine to make peace enforcement operations especially subject to political and diplomatic considerations, with significant impact on the associated military options.

The following sections examine some of the political aspects of peace enforcement operations in the Dominican Republic and in Somalia. In particular, these sections focus on rules of engagement, "prisoners of war," national restrictions on military roles, the need for political awareness in the military, and the necessity to find an "enemy." After looking at these operations, these sections offer some general observations and recommendations for future peace enforcement actions.

Dominican Republic

Rules of Engagement

In the Dominican Republic intervention, the rules of engagement (ROE) had to be understood at all levels and reflect the political objectives of the Organization of American States (OAS) and its member states. Balancing this was the need to keep ROE from becoming a hindrance to operations or leading to needless casualties.

In General Palmer's oral history, he claims no rules of engagement were prescribed for operations in the Dominican Republic, so "we developed our own."³ Even if technically true, the ROE were certainly under scrutiny and were consistently tightened by Washington. Dr Lawrence A. Yates cites State Department telegrams to the embassy in Santo Domingo carrying orders from the president to use no more force than necessary and specifying particular areas and actions which could be supported with US troops.⁴ When the Latin American troops arrived, they accepted the same rules of engagement and promulgated them in their operations plans.⁵ As expressed at lower echelons, the ROE, even early in the operation (5 May 1965), were tight indeed. Orders issued by the commander of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, specify that "Marines were permitted to fire only when they had been fired upon directly and had a clearly identifiable target which could be hit, preferably with one round." The Marine order also limited such responses to small arms. No mortars, cannon, or crew-serve weapons were to be used.⁶

The ROE were understood by the American Marines and soldiers, though they were not liked. Well-disciplined, they seldom violated the orders. To avoid any chance of injudicious application of force, Palmer denied the decision to fire to individuals or their immediate superiors. Only platoon leaders or higher could authorize return fire except in extreme situations.⁷ Concerned about overstepping their bounds, the Marines forbade even the application of riot control agents without direct approval by a battalion commander. By 28 May the Marines were forbidden to carry more than 15 rounds of rifle ammunition (10 for most units) or five rounds of pistol ammunition.^{8,9,10}

While American forces honored the letter of the ROE, the Latin Americans—officially under the same rules—interpreted them much more loosely, and often violated them freely with little resulting criticism.¹¹ At one point, the Latin American brigade came under sniper fire, abandoned the ROE, and started a prolonged fire fight with Constitutionalist forces. General Palmer later characterized their response as "trigger happiness." He singled out the Hondurans' lax fire discipline, saying they "loved to throw hand grenades like popcorn."¹²

Though strict from the start, ROE continued to tighten as diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis intensified. In general terms, the ROE began as "don't fire unless fired upon." This agreement was enforced with increasingly strict discipline. Eventually, as political factors became more important, OAS forces were forbidden from capturing and holding rebel positions. According to Palmer, "the US decision to seek a negotiated settlement required forces to not return fire—to shoot only when absolutely necessary to protect their lives or positions."¹³ Rules for conducting checkpoints and roadblocks also seemed to change frequently. Marines spoke of information from "higher authority" which "constantly changed as to who could pass checkpoints, [and] what passes/credentials were to be honored. . . ."¹⁴

Ultimately, the ROE passed through more constrictions, ending in a "prohibition against firing unless one's position was in imminent danger of

being overrun.”¹⁵ This increasingly strict ROE led to dangerous situations for the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). There are numerous cases of direct danger to OAS forces due to strict ROE, but one serves to illustrate the problem.

During a morning clearing operation on 30 April 1965, Company I, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, came under heavy fire from a crew-served machine gun and numerous snipers in buildings near the airport. With his men pinned down, the company commander requested permission to use a bazooka (3.5" rockets) to clear the buildings. His request went beyond normal ROE, so it had to go up the chain of command—eventually all the way to President Johnson who ultimately authorized the use of rockets. However, this authorization did not come for several hours. Meanwhile, the company was forced to clear the buildings from the inside using a series of squad rushes. In multiple incidents, they suffered one Marine killed and eight more wounded before authorization to use the rockets came. Using the bazooka, Company I quickly reduced the remaining positions with no other losses.¹⁶

ROE must be appropriate to the military and political situation and clearly communicated to forces at all levels in the chain of command. The rules should not place military men and women in untenable situations. Where such rules are dictated, the commanders on the scene have an obligation to protest vigorously, and the authorities in Washington or New York have an obligation to listen.¹⁷

Prisoners

One of the stickiest problems in peace enforcement operations remains the issue of prisoners. This problem includes both what to do when our forces are taken captive, and what we do when peace enforcers themselves take prisoners. In the Dominican Republic, OAS forces were under constant threat of capture. In some cases, soldiers on patrol strayed out of OAS-controlled areas and were taken captive. Sometimes they were returned unharmed, but on other occasions, bodies which had been “found” were brought to OAS checkpoints. On at least one occasion, direct negotiations between civilian OAS representatives in Santo Domingo and rebel forces yielded the release of two unwounded Marines after a third was shot and killed. Marine command diaries refer to the two recovered Marines as prisoners of war (POW), even though there was no declared war and the Geneva convention was not invoked.¹⁸ How to handle POW never appears in Brig Gen Frank Linnell’s staff meeting notes of the period, so if there was any general policy about how to deal with POW it is not recorded.¹⁹

The subject of enemy prisoner of war (EPW) is more fully covered in the records. The first prisoners were taken soon after the 3d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division arrived in the country. The prisoners were officially referred to as detainees to avoid legal implications, since the operation was a peace enforcement action, not a war action. According to Yates, prisoners were taken “in bunches” and because of inadequate facilities and lack of military police (MP), the first “batch” was turned over to Dominican police.

Since the Dominican police were an agent of the opposing faction, this agreement was like letting the fox guard the hen house. The Dominican police simply rounded up the prisoners in a courtyard and shot them, earning poor marks for not only the interim Dominican government, but the US as well.²⁰ As a result, the Army stepped up efforts to bring in adequate numbers of military police, and US forces were instructed not to turn over any more prisoners or their weapons to the Dominican police. The detainees or line crossers were now interviewed by counterintelligence linguists and photographed. Counter-intelligence and civil affairs personnel would screen these line crossers and then select detainees to be *evacuated*²¹ (emphasis added).

In hindsight, the shortage of MPs seems like poor planning followed by bad judgment in turning prisoners over to their local opponents. It seems the US went to the Dominican Republic expecting to fight a war. Initial intelligence said the US would be fighting 25,000 armor-equipped "Communists." Even so, the force packages did not provide for MP/POW handling troops, instead specifying only combat forces.²² Furthermore, checkpoints were jointly manned at that time using US forces and loyalist Dominican army and police personnel. Clearly, the US was not neutral, and this blinded them to the danger of turning over members of one faction in the civil war to the other faction. Politically, this incident provided part of the impetus to push US and OAS forces to a more neutral stance. I return to the need for neutrality later in this section.

National Constraints

One of the most direct ways political considerations affect military operations is through constraints placed by national command authorities on their forces. As in every peace operation, the US, and later IAPF, forces were significantly restricted. Within their constraints, commanders had to employ forces to maximize their effectiveness. In a conflict where distinguishing combatant forces from civilians was nearly impossible and where a purely "military solution" was rejected almost immediately, troop commanders were in a particularly difficult situation. However, experience shows that in peace operations, this is the normal situation, not an aberration.

Despite the precarious diplomatic balance the US and the OAS were attempting to strike in reconciling the factions, the leaders—at least in the early months—saw a war which "could be won." In late April, only a few weeks after US troops had landed, Ambassador Bennett and key military counterparts, Major General York and Commodore Dare, thought a showdown with the Constitutionalist forces likely. They deployed their troops accordingly, paying scant attention to OAS efforts to mediate a cease-fire.²³ Though York, as ground forces commander, witnessed a cease-fire agreement signed by the ruling Junta and the Constitutionalist leaders, he did not recognize the agreement.²⁴ After arriving, Lieutenant General Palmer also repudiated any such agreement, feeling it put US forces in an untenable situation.

As the situation unfolded, control from Washington (both US government and OAS) tightened. Though General Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, decried field commander's "having their hands tied by . . . theorists at higher headquarters," the hand-tying continued.²⁵ According to the Marine history report, the operation was governed by "close civilian and military control at the highest levels of government in Washington."²⁶

What was the effect of this control? In many cases the IAPF was restricted both geographically and operationally from conducting operations as they would have preferred. While the OAS ambassadors strove to bring the factions to the bargaining table, York, and later Palmer, fought for increased troop numbers. They also argued for the need to split the rebel forces and unite the geographically separated Army and Marine controlled areas. President Johnson tried to accommodate both sides,²⁷ and as usual in such compromises, pleased neither. Later, on 15 June 1965, the Latin American brigade and the 82d Airborne Division attacked and pushed the rebel (Constitutionalist) forces almost into the river. A military victory seemed imminent which would put the ruling Dominican military junta in sole command of Santo Domingo. But, just as the final push was about to begin, General Palmer, under orders from Washington, overruled General Alvim and ordered York to stop his troops (the 82d). Washington felt strongly that a diplomatic solution, not a military one must resolve the Dominican conflict. As quoted by Yates, General Palmer said neither York nor Alvim understood the rationale and "didn't like it worth a damn."²⁸ This was the last time a military solution by IAPF troops was attempted.

The case of Radio Santo Domingo further demonstrates the political restrictions. The creation of an International Security Zone²⁹ had been approved by Washington and occupied by OAS troops. This zone split the city into a southern section predominantly occupied by the interim government and a northern area controlled by Constitutionalist forces. On the recommendation of the MAAG group commander, Col Joe Quilty, the zone left the primary radio station in the hands of the Constitutionalists. Although the station was used to broadcast anti-OAS and anti-US propaganda, it remained beyond IAPF control. The military, and later the CIA, demanded its removal, but Washington forbade any moves to silence the station. Dominican government forces eventually captured it in the last two weeks of May 1965.³⁰ Palmer later said the OAS forces had been in no way able to interfere with the Dominican government operation and did not want to become the "ham in a ham sandwich" between the two sides, but it is clear the OAS shed no tears over the rebels' loss of Radio Santo Domingo.³¹ In fact, the official Brazilian history repudiates Palmer by recording that Latin units actually assisted the Dominicans during the operation.³² Thus, this "thorn in the side" was removed by proxy.

According to the Marines, the "political restrictions placed military commanders at a tactical disadvantage." The clear mission of evacuating US and foreign national civilians became clouded by later US and OAS policies. Military commanders "had to be prepared to take on the trappings of a

diplomat.”³³ Instead of the clear military solution they thought could be achieved, generals were placed in the uncomfortable situation of mediating a national dispute alongside career politicians and diplomats.

The rush to defuse the crisis and quickly reduce military forces led to withdrawals based on numbers of servicemen, not units. This rush caused a breakdown in “tactical unity” among deployed Marines and left “major units in a disorganized state, unavailable for deployment elsewhere if the need arose.”³⁴ The decision was taken without consultation with the military and once made, was apparently too sensitive to change.

Despite the problems such political oversight and restrictions caused and the apparent incongruity between military and political aims in the Dominican Republic, General Palmer realized a political solution would be in the US’s best interests.³⁵ He worked diligently to mold force application to the diplomats’ designs. While he continued to try to shape political decisions to military realities, he remained the soldier-statesman, seldom losing sight of the political nature of the crisis.

Political Understanding

If political objectives are foremost in peace enforcement operations, did individuals at all levels of command understand the political objectives and corresponding restrictions? Was such understanding at the lower levels of the force really necessary? According to General Palmer, the political “facts of life” must be clear to everyone from the commanding general to the private manning the roadblock if a peace operation was to be successful.³⁶ In the Dominican crisis, political awareness began at the military’s highest level. General Wheeler advised Palmer at the onset to “get close to the ambassador,” adding “this is as much political as it is military.” Palmer later said it was good advice. Clearly, he saw the inevitability of Washington taking direct control of the military situation in the Dominican Republic.³⁷ Still, he was never politically passive. On one occasion, the OAS wanted to dismiss conservative, senior Dominican army officers—a demand from Colonel Caamaño (leader of the Constitutionalist forces.) Palmer told the OAS he would support such a dismissal if ordered, but warned that General Alvim and the Latin American brigade would not and, if pushed, the IAPF would probably unravel. Ambassador Bunker accepted Palmer’s advice, and the OAS dropped their support for Caamaño’s demand.³⁸

Palmer felt his political awareness must be transmitted to his troops. In his oral history he talked at length of the importance of leveling with the soldiers. He said this “leveling” had to begin with the senior officers who should, in turn, educate their company grade officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO). He felt his troops “understood that Dominican situation probably better than Ambassador Bunker did.”³⁹ Political naiveté among leadership and staff could have extreme consequences. Palmer noted that if the staff and commanders were not kept politically informed, they would probably do

"something dumb" or let the overall commander do "something dumb."⁴⁰ He apparently spoke from experience.⁴¹

General Alvim suffered a similar reluctance to submit totally to political oversight. His stubbornness eventually provoked a showdown. In early January 1966, during a coup attempt by right-wing Dominican military officers, Alvim refused to support the provisional Dominican government. At OAS Ambassador Bunker's insistence and "in light of his political unreliability," Alvim was quietly recalled by Brazil.⁴²

If political education for military forces was important, how did this education take place? In addition to the informal indoctrination by troop leaders to the NCOs and privates already mentioned, each soldier was issued a copy of President Lyndon B. Johnson's speech justifying US intervention. They were also issued a fact sheet which outlined the main objectives of the operation: protection for and evacuation of US citizens and foreign nationals, initiation of humanitarian programs, and prevention of a Communist victory.⁴³

Palmer felt that in a peace enforcement mission, tactical leaders' initiatives should be dramatically curtailed—a contrast to normal wartime operations. Instead of allowing local initiative, "the senior commander must translate political guidance into specific tactical guidance for subordinates."⁴⁴ Palmer placed emphasis on the political awareness of his troops, but also required the guidance issued by commanders to reflect political objectives, leaving little room for misunderstanding.

Despite his emphasis on political awareness, all was not as rosy as Palmer may have thought. According to Yates' research, US soldiers in the Dominican Republic were, by their own admission, uneducated on political-military operations and confused by political control of military operations. In Yates' words, "Their only training came through painful experience."⁴⁵ The difference between commanders' perception and the actual education received by the troops points to a need for more formalized political indoctrination. If such awareness was as important as Palmer asserted, it is hard to understand the haphazard and informal education process. Despite Palmer's own assertion that US forces understand the political environment, they remained largely ignorant.

Choosing an Enemy

Perhaps the largest political-military disconnect in the Dominican intervention was over the issue of who was the enemy and the extent of IAPF neutrality. In the first days of US involvement, President Johnson addressed the nation, and in his opening remarks, said, "Let me also make clear tonight that we support no single man or any single group of men in the DR [Dominican Republic]." The seeds of later confusion were sown when later in the same address, he went on to explain, "Our goal . . . is to help prevent another Communist state in this hemisphere."⁴⁶ Palmer admits in his oral history that in the beginning, his mission was to "support whatever

government the ambassador could scrape together,” but in later periodic reports he said US forces were engaged in stability operations whose goal was neither “to maintain the status quo . . . *nor to support any particular faction or political group*”⁴⁷ (emphasis added). In both Johnson and Palmer’s statements the term *neutrality* seemed quite flexible.

The subject of when, if ever, true neutrality was enforced in dealings with the two factions remains cloudy. Palmer designated 16 May as the date from which neutrality was enforced. He cites the order on that date to “neutralize” the Dominican navy and air force.⁴⁸ Yates dates true even-handedness from the Red Cross negotiated peace-settlement of 21 May 1965.⁴⁹ However, as late as 27 May armed Dominican government soldiers were allowed to freely traverse OAS lines, while “rebels” had no such freedom. Even on 30 May a Marine Corps “enemy situation map” depicted only “rebel” territory.⁵⁰ As the situation developed, US forces accepted less assistance from government troops, but throughout the operation, the Loyalist faction received more favorable treatment than the Constitutionalist.

In the first month of operations, neutrality was not even cosmetic. When the Constitutionalist “congress” elected Caamaño president, US officials ignored the event, continuing to seek a “more suitable government.” Eventually General Imbert, US choice to lead the Government of National Reconciliation, was sworn in on 7 May.⁵¹ US forces specifically sought Dominican soldiers to help at roadblocks and checkpoints, and two platoons of Dominican army soldiers were attached to US units. A national police liaison officer, Capt Daniel Moore, was also attached to the 6th Marine Regiment for the extent of their deployment. One of Moore’s prime services was guiding Marine movements to avoid rebel areas.⁵² In Operation Forward March, a movement to straighten US lines in the International Security Zone, US forces coordinated extensively with the Dominican army and national police.⁵³

While the policy of favoritism was officially endorsed through such actions, it was reinforced by informal factors. Inadequately briefed soldiers assumed their mission was to “kill commies” and assumed the communist-influenced Constitutionalist (rebels) were their enemy. The characterization of rebels as “communist” was widespread and appears frequently in official diaries and logs.⁵⁴ As early as 2 May, battalion commanders discussed the danger of “immediate threat from dissident elements . . .,” painting the Constitutionalist as the enemy.⁵⁵

As General Palmer pointed out, this portrayal of the leftists as the enemy was encouraged by Constitutionalist aggression. As he phrased it, “. . . as far as our troops were concerned, one side was shooting at them, and the other wasn’t. And the guys that were shooting at them—it was hard to tell the troops that they weren’t ‘enemy.’”⁵⁶ Later rebel actions reinforced such views. They were discovered using ambulances to transport arms and troops, sometimes concealing them in coffins. Shoe shine boys were found selling poisoned food and soda and hiding weapons in their boxes.⁵⁷

Latin American IAPF forces shared this perception. Brazilian documents talk of forming up lines opposite the Constitutionalist area—termed *Rebel*

Zones—from which nightly mortar attacks would rain down on their positions. Colonel Meira-Mattos describes how Constitutionlists would cross the lines during the day as civilians, reconnoiter the Latin positions, then attack that night.⁵⁸ But, considering that the Latin American brigade was reinforced by two Dominican army tank platoons, it is understandable that the Constitutionlists would fail to acknowledge OAS “neutrality.”⁵⁹

The identification of the leftist, Constitutionalist faction as the enemy and the Dominican government (in any of several incarnations) as the friendly side may have been inevitable in the cold war 1960s. Whether the Rebels attacked OAS troops because they sided with the opposing faction, or whether the OAS troops sided with the government because of the Rebel attacks is unclear. What *is* clear is that real peace was not possible until the OAS took a more neutral stand.

Somalia

Rules of Engagement


As in the Dominican Republic intervention, political considerations governed Somalia peace enforcement operations. Unlike the Dominican Republic, the ROE in Somalia reflected political objectives without running counter to operational requirements or leading to avoidable casualties. The basic principle of the Somalia ROE was that a soldier could fire to defend himself if threatened. Unlike the Dominican Republic, forces did not have to be fired upon before they could defend themselves. This principle remained in effect throughout the mission and was later accepted by UNOSOM II.⁶⁰

The ROE were formulated at USCENTCOM headquarters with recommendations from the 10th Mountain Division and 1st MEF judge advocates.⁶¹ With additional input from the command’s State Department representative, CENTCOM’s judge advocate completed the ROE, and after a series of iterations between CENTCOM and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), they were approved. After approval, incremental adjustments in the implementation were made based on inputs from the field commander, Gen Robert B. Johnston, and UNITAF’s judge advocate, Colonel Lorenz.⁶² Learning from the 1983 Lebanon operations, the military were proactive in defining the ROE for Somalia, then getting them blessed by higher authority, rather than waiting to have ROE imposed.⁶³

Almost every nation supplying forces to UNITAF adopted the US ROE.⁶⁴ Most were pleased with the less stringent ROE. In particular, the French and Canadians, who had suffered under highly restrictive ROE in Bosnia and Cambodia, were relieved by their freedom under UNITAF rules.⁶⁵ Even though the coalition used the same ROE, force contingents had various interpretations of the rules. These were usually minor differences driven by national policy or training level. To standardize, the JTF headquarters employed a “coalition force coordination cell” to coordinate ROE and

commander's intent among the force contributors.⁶⁶ UNITAF also established a briefing, given by the staff attorney in cooperation with the liaison cell, to resolve any interpretation difficulties.⁶⁷ To ensure the rules were clear and understood by the average soldier, they were reduced by Colonel Lorenz to simple language, put on cards, and passed through the various chains of command to the lowest level (fig. 3). For continued adherence and to ensure new arrivals were informed, UNITAF scheduled periodic ROE refresher classes.

The ROE process, though well thought-out, was not without problems. The biggest shortcoming cited by those I interviewed was the lack of guidance on implementing nonlethal force. The rules were clear about deadly force, but if an individual soldier decided such force was unwarranted, he had few officially sanctioned tools to implement "the minimum force necessary." A number of informal solutions were developed to fill this void. One was a large tent stake—sometimes referred to as a "Somali-be-good-stick"—used as a make shift billy club. The sticks served well since the normal tool for internal discipline among Somalis is a large, ornate stick wielded freely by a tribal elder. In situations where a bullet was too much, tent stakes often served



Source: Capt David A. Dawson, USMC

Figure 3. ROE Pocket Card Issued for Operation Restore Hope

well. Tent stakes were also affixed, pointing outward, to vehicles as make-shift pikes to ward off attackers in a style reminiscent of the Road Warrior movie vehicles. Perhaps the best-known nonlethal force tool was cayenne pepper spray used in lieu of tear gas for riot control. However, the cayenne spray was not available until well into the operation.⁶⁸

Incidentally, the dilemma over applying nonlethal force was most acute among Western contingents. Most African and Arab contingents quickly arrived at a "proportional force" policy. When Moroccan forces were attacked by rock-throwing teenagers, they simply began throwing rocks back at the assailants. The "children" soon learned not to attack the Moroccan vehicles, though they continued to attack US vehicles. Eventually, Major General Arnold, ARFOR commander, did an ROE review covering how and when to apply lethal and nonlethal force and prescribing the use of Somali elders in dealing with attacks whenever possible. Nondeadly force application was taught using anecdotal evidence and hypothetical scenarios.⁶⁹ This additional training helped significantly in the day-to-day work among the people.

The other major issue with ROE lay not in the rules, but in the ability of the contingents to execute them. The UNITAF forces were, by and large, good soldiers with highly developed combat skills. These soldiers often restricted themselves, refusing to fire even when the ROE permitted it because they were unsure of their target or unconvinced that deadly force was necessary. Members of the Joint History Team attributed this restraint to both "good soldier skills" and high ethical standards.⁷⁰

As UN-sanctioned UNITAF gave way to UN-controlled UNOSOM II, the official ROE did not change, but the quality of the troops who replaced their countries' "elite" units were, on average, less well trained and disciplined. For instance the Pakistani 6th Battalion, Punjab Regiment, highly respected for their competence, was later augmented by other units in the Pakistani brigade which were inferior, even by the assessment of the Pakistanis. UNOSOM II troops were supposed to provide security for the continuing relief effort—reinforced by the US Army Quick Reaction Force (QRF). However, most UNOSOM II forces were oriented more toward logistics and combat support. When the mission turned into offensive operations in June, these forces were much less able to operate effectively in a combat environment and to execute the ROE with the same reserve and accuracy as the UNITAF forces.⁷¹

Even before the shift to UNOSOM II, ROE implementation was being gradually tightened. The rules themselves remained constant, but they were interpreted with increasing strictness and were tailored to specific locations. For instance, in Mogadishu, the forces began using highly trained snipers as a kind of direct fire support. If attacked or in danger, patrols would often relay the situation to over-watching snipers who could apply force more accurately than the patrol.⁷² UNOSOM II forces were unequipped or psychologically unprepared to implement this type of sophisticated reaction.⁷³ The tragedy of 5 June, when 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in ambush, was not the fault of over-restrictive ROE, but of faulty intelligence and poor training.

Despite being more strictly interpreted, at least through the end of UNITAF, the ROE were flexible and appropriate to the mission. Unlike the Dominican intervention and many other peace operations, UNITAF provided a well-defined feedback loop so ROE could be adjusted or reinterpreted in a timely fashion, based on the local commander's needs. Staff judge advocates (SJA) with special ROE training walked the streets of Mogadishu, and the lawyer became a very real and highly valued staff member.⁷⁴ The combination of a tight ROE feedback loop back to CENTCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the on-the-street work of the SJAs kept the rules realistic. All in all, the rules of engagement were one of the bright spots of Operation Restore Hope.

Prisoners

While the ROE process was much improved, a perennial problem of peace operations remained for both UNITAF and UNOSOM II—the problem of prisoners. Again, this topic is two-sided and includes both the prisoners captured by UNITAF and UNOSOM forces and coalition troops captured by the Somalis. I begin with the far more common dilemma of Somalis captured by coalition forces.

Somalia was not the site of an international armed conflict, and it had not even the semblance of a civilian government. Therefore, neither the Geneva conventions nor civil law could be applied. Some of the resulting problems have been mentioned. How do you tell combatants from criminals? Should a Somali captured while attacking a patrol be treated differently from a Somali caught breaking into a warehouse? These questions, though addressed in the legal annexes, were never really resolved and continued to plague the soldiers and Marines in Somalia.

There is some indication that detainees⁷⁵ were planned for by the lower echelons, but overall implementation was inconsistent. In the absence of actual war, all prisoners had to be treated as criminals. Still, an informal distinction was made between criminals who would have been EPWs in a war and those who would have been civil criminals. ARFOR headquarters established a detainee compound, but it was limited to handling those who had fired on peace enforcement troops or their charges. Without civil police, no option was available for pure criminals. When possible, coalition forces turned them over to clan elders, but this practice was spotty and normally not viable. In most cases, a Somali who had committed a crime such as theft against a protected HRO compound or military storage area was held for a few hours and released.⁷⁶ The futility of arresting Somalis soon became obvious.

In cases where Somali-on-Somali crime was witnessed, the forces had even fewer options. Before the Somali police force was reestablished, military forces had no choice but to either ignore the violence or, after stopping a crime, release the assailant. In one case an Army team was able to stop a gang-rape committed in plain view, but had nowhere to take the offenders.⁷⁷

Again and again in my research, those I interviewed raised the same issue: they had no method for dealing with criminals.

After the process began to re-establish local police forces—not yet complete at the time of this writing—the troops had some outlet. Still, re-constituting the police merely postponed the problem since no judicial or penal systems existed.⁷⁸ In some cases the frustration of local commanders led them to skirt the edge of international law in establishing local police forces and judicial systems. Marine forces in Baidoa established an auxiliary police force to deal with local criminals. For legal reasons, the force was termed *auxiliary police* or *security force* since US forces are forbidden from establishing, training, or materially aiding foreign police forces.⁷⁹ A similar effort was successful in Baderra by using former Somali police officers.⁸⁰ Despite isolated success stories, neither the US military nor its coalition partners were in any position to reinstitute the native rule of law.

In fact, US forces and some Western allies were nearly alone in detaining prisoners.⁸¹ Many contingents, especially those from less developed areas, saw immediate punishment as more productive than incarceration.⁸² This treatment was familiar to Somalis who had previously dealt with crime in much the same way. After a while, criminal acts tended to decrease in the areas controlled by these contingents and increase in the areas controlled by the US and other, more restrained contingents.⁸³ In the long run, almost all criminals (including those who attacked coalition forces or HRO) were released to commit further acts of violence. How to handle detainees in an intrastate peace enforcement situation remains unanswered.⁸⁴

For contingent members captured by Somalis, the issue was not much clearer. Though seldom discussed publicly, the capture of peace enforcers was considered and planned for at the operational level. According to Lt Col Paul Eaton, ARFOR G-3, POWs were prevented during UNITAF through extraordinary measures. No helicopters or vehicles were allowed to travel alone, and a reaction platoon or company was always on-call. Wherever possible, escort was increased and exposure decreased.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the subject of what to do once a coalition member was captured was not discussed. According to Col Gary W. Anderson, "The military leadership was warned [prisoners or catastrophic casualties] would happen, but neither the State Department nor military leadership wanted to deal with it."⁸⁶ Beyond taking measures to prevent such an occurrence, no further guidance was issued. Lt Col William J. Martinez, ground component commander of the UNOSOM II QRF and Lt Col Charles Borchini, 8th Psyops Battalion commander, agreed that preparation for POWs broke down at the tactical level. Once prisoners were taken—including the celebrated capture of Army Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant—the mission became "very emotional." After the casualties suffered on June 5th, most contingents drew back into a "fortress stance," effectively returning the streets of Mogadishu to the warlords.⁸⁷

All those interviewed for this study agreed the capture of a US or coalition soldier was inevitable. However, neither the US nor the UN publicly discussed the possibility, and this silence only magnified the public shock and

outcry once the inevitable happened. Ambassador Alexander Borg-Olivier agreed that when United Nations forces suffer POWs, the UN and troop contributors must share the responsibility. Still, no clear-cut solution exists, and the issue is aggravated by the fact that the belligerents are not party to, aware of, or even care about international obligations under treaties or agreements on the treatment of prisoners.⁸⁸

Perhaps the UN should have taken more aggressive action to prevent the ambushes and captures, but in any significant conflict, prisoners must be anticipated. One thing that can be done is to prepare the public for that likelihood and assure military coalition members of a professional and uniform response to the capture of a coalition soldier. Of course, publicizing the possibility of casualties and prisoners may squelch public support for an operation, but if public support is marginal, the contingent should reconsider involvement.

National Constraints

Another impact on coalition operations in Somalia was the political constraint troop providers placed on their forces. To a much greater extent than in the Dominican Republic, national leaders put limits on the places a force could be used and the types of missions it could perform. Such constraints should be expected; multinational forces must be employed to maximize their utility and minimize the overall impact of these restrictions.

In general, every member of the coalition force negotiated either mission or geography and often both. The coalition nations fell loosely into three groups. The first gave general guidance and broad latitude to their local commanders and included the Canadians and Australians. These contingents were practically unlimited in terms of the actions they could perform. The second group included forces who required little support but were somewhat restricted by their national command authority either geographically or operationally. This group included Pakistani and Moroccan forces. The final group included both large and small contingents who were constrained by either the type of mission they could accept, their area of responsibility, or both. This group included most Arab contingents, the Italians, Germans, and Belgians.⁸⁹

Many of the smaller contingents were willing to go beyond their initial mandate, and if asked, would petition their governments for wider latitude and a bigger role. This was particularly true of the African contingents who were aware they were establishing their international credentials. On the other extreme, some national contingents did as little as possible and just had to be "worked around."⁹⁰

Among countries with specific geographic requirements, the Belgians refused to work anywhere other than in Kismayo where Belgian HRO relief efforts were concentrated. The Italians insisted on northern Mogadishu, even though this split the city in an inconvenient way.⁹¹ Small contingents had geographic requirements as well. Most wanted to stay on the airfield, away

from the more dangerous missions and near their logistics. Major General Arnold took pains to encourage and praise these units to draw them out and give them more ambitious roles. Often the ARFOR G-3 had to work directly with a small contingent's operations officer to personally "set things up" so they could move off the airfield.⁹²

While this method worked for contingents with some degree of local authority, others with less authority, or who were uninterested in broadening their mandate, simply stayed put. In some cases, the JTF commander was able to accommodate the contingent's wishes, and the overall UNITAF mission suffered little. Belgian forces, for example, stayed in Kismayo, but were quite effective in getting the aid through. However, when the nation building expanded under UNOSOM II, these contingents were often unwilling to move out to fully occupy their assigned humanitarian relief sector (HRS). Again, the Belgian contingent is a good example. While doing an excellent job within the city, they practically ignored the surrounding countryside.⁹³

Compounding the geographic constraints were mission restrictions borne out of a need to reduce or eliminate risk. Perhaps the most extreme example of this was the German contingent, which could not accept any possibility of casualties. According to the Joint History Team, this possibility "humiliated" the German commander. The United States was also risk-conscious and frequently cancelled missions if, during the planning phase, it did not appear to be a sure success. Often coalitions were more afraid of failure than of casualties.⁹⁴

After the UNOSOM II mission turned offensive, many nations' risk tolerance level dropped. In particular, the Pakistani, Moroccan, and Italian contingents drew back into extreme defensive postures. Colonel Anderson attributed this to the use of peacekeeping troops for a peace enforcement mission. When UNOSOM II took over, most combat troops were replaced by peacekeepers and logisticians. These troops, equipped primarily for humanitarian missions, were suddenly thrust into the role of combat troops. Many nations simply refused to participate.⁹⁵ Some UN military advisors attributed this problem to the varying interpretations of UN Resolution 814 which authorized the rebuilding of Somalia as a nation. While the US saw the need to "marginalize" the warlords, the Italians saw a strictly humanitarian UNOSOM II mission. The purposefully vague resolution caused a failure in translating UN (strategic) guidance into operational and tactical guidance.⁹⁶

Ethnic and religious factors also limited coalition members. Initially UNITAF officials were concerned about the placement of Italians in Mogadishu because of their colonial past there. Rather than causing a conflict as feared, the Italians instead appeared to become friendly with the Ali Mahdi faction. Their seeming favoritism had the potential for polarizing the main factions, and Johnston was obliged to consider this development in the plan to stabilize Mogadishu.⁹⁷

Arab members were sometimes constrained by both culture and history. While the United Arab Emirates (UAE) saw the Somali mission as a historical obligation, the Egyptian history of disharmony in Somalia led them

to severely limit their operations. This was compounded by the fact that Boutros Boutros-Ghali was Egyptian and unpopular with the Somali people. Ramadan also affected Arab peace operations since Moslems from the Arabian peninsula refrain from eating and drinking (even water) during the day—a big limitation in an area like Somalia.⁹⁸ While no single limitation was a “show-stopper,” they all had to be thought through and accounted for.⁹⁹

The Somali people had a strong sense of cultural and racial superiority over all other African and many non-African developing countries. They would tolerate white Americans or Western Europeans whom they considered near-equals, but balked at the idea of Black-African troops patrolling their towns or distributing relief supplies. In other areas the Somalis were equally resentful of former colonial powers like France or Italy. This combined to make HRS allocation quite a challenge.¹⁰⁰

Meeting the combination of contingent requirements and constraints was very challenging for UNITAF, but within the limited mission, inspired leaders like Johnston and Arnold proved equal to the task. Some countries were used to their maximum capabilities while others were simply worked around. Often various contingents even competed to see who could do the most as a way to boost their national image. However, when UNOSOM II took over, their much larger mandate, reduced forces, national constraints, and lack of unity took a tremendous toll. Eventually the broadened, more militant mission caused General Bir, in the words of one battalion commander, “to lose complete control for a while.”¹⁰¹

In all coalition operations national command authorities restrict their forces. If the command has a narrow mission and sufficient unity of purpose, the contingents can work within their limits and still accomplish the mission. However, if, as in UNOSOM II, the operation suffers under divergent command authority, a greatly enlarged mandate, and a simultaneous reduction in forces, both in quality and quantity, seems almost inevitable.

Political Understanding

In Somalia, the UNITAF commander saw both his political and military objectives to be narrow. According to Walter Clarke, State Department deputy to the US special envoy, General Johnston did not want to see that, after the first few weeks, his limited goal was untenable. In Clarke's words, Johnston refused to accept his implied authority in a nation without a government; the narrow political blinders Johnston and his senior military authorities wore doomed UNOSOM II from the very beginning.¹⁰² While an extreme view of the commanders' political myopia, Mr Clarke is by no means alone. Conversely, others saw Johnston as extremely politically aware, careful to maintain the exact scope envisioned by President Bush when he committed US forces in November 1992. Regardless of perspective, all agree Johnston had a political vision for success in Somalia which matched his military strategy. But what of the personnel below him? Did they have political insight and an overall understanding of the mission in Somalia? Is such knowledge necessary?

As Col Toralv Nordbø of the Norwegian UN delegation puts it, "One little [political mistake] can ruin the whole thing." To minimize these mistakes, he maintained even privates should understand the political situation since they will make many critical, politically charged decisions. Orders can't be given to cover all circumstances, and time will slip away while senior officers are brought in.¹⁰³ Other advisors had mixed responses, but all supported the idea that at least battalion commanders and above should be well versed in both political and military objectives. Maj Gen Anthony C. Zinni agreed political education is extremely important for all field grade officers, but that only cultural awareness and an understanding of the military mission should be emphasized at lower levels.¹⁰⁴ Tempering this still further, Col Richard P. Gray of the New Zealand delegation cautioned that "impartiality can be a victim of political knowledge."¹⁰⁵

Despite the opinions of General Zinni and some UN military advisors that political decisions are limited to field grade and senior officers, choices requiring an understanding of the overall political objectives were often made by junior officers in Somalia. In Afgoye, an MP company commander was given the task of "cleaning up the town." Beyond running the bandits off the streets, he had to identify responsible citizens, form local government councils, and restart the town's civil organization. This captain served both as mayor's advisor and civil service coordinator until local authorities could take over. Because of his talent and overall understanding of the political dimension of his actions, he was successful.¹⁰⁶

Some insist that a basic understanding of the political goals should go all the way to the "PFC-level." Citing the old adage that all military men are "ambassadors in uniform," these officers remind us that knowledge is a force multiplier. A soldier who understands the objectives and the environment doesn't have to be continually motivated.¹⁰⁷ Among the soldiers in the cities there was a periodic, ground-swell chorus of "why are we here?" Few Somalis within the cities were openly starving, and many soldiers began to be confused about the deployment's overall purpose. Thinking commanders rotated soldiers out into the countryside to see the starvation and the differences made by the feeding stations and relief convoys. After seeing the end-result of their work, they better understood the "big picture."¹⁰⁸

Although many officers and enlisted men had some grasp of the political situation and overall objectives, most officials and military leaders simply "understood that they didn't understand" the political dimension. Dr Robert K. Wright of the Joint Historical Team interviewed dozens of officers and diplomats in Somalia from Ambassador Oakly and General Johnston to junior officers and NCOs. He insists that most officers felt they knew neither the "end-state" nor their purpose in the grand scheme.¹⁰⁹

On another level, many officers were ignorant of the politics of coalition operations. Many midgrade and senior US officers were ignorant of the position and power some of their foreign counterparts wielded. When they saw a Turkish or Moroccan major, they were likely to treat him with the same deference they would an American of equal rank—which is to say very little.

Most did not understand that foreign commanders were hand-picked, highly educated, direct representatives of their governments. These “mere” majors and lieutenant colonels often reported nightly to their national command authorities.¹¹⁰ The implications for political and diplomatic relations are sobering and vividly demonstrate the urgent need for political-military advisors to the commander.

Do soldiers in a multinational peace enforcement need to understand the overall mission? I believe they do. They may not need the knowledge of an ambassador or JTF commander, but should know the general political and military objectives and his place in the overall plan. Cultural, political, and mission training are all essential to a successful operation. The soldier really is “an ambassador in uniform.”

Choosing an Enemy

The most controversial decision of our Somalia experience was our decision to abandon neutrality and pursue a specific enemy. Unlike the Dominican Republic where the coalition began the operation very partisan in outlook before moving toward even-handedness, the UNOSOM II force abandoned UNITAF's impartial stance to pursue a single faction.¹¹¹

A neutral position does not imply pacifism. Under UNITAF, the forces were impartial, yet sided against lawlessness and banditry. As one officer put it, “everyone was a bad guy.” It was not personalized. A good example was the US and Belgian response to the violence between rival warlords, “Colonel” Jess and “General” Morgan. UNITAF forces went to extremes to be even-handed, yet forced a cease-fire. Senior officers and diplomats worked hard to dialogue with all parties. Though UNITAF tried to stop the fighting, they did so without eliminating contenders for power.¹¹²

Once UNOSOM II took over, though, their charter to rebuild Somalia required a stable Somali government. Mohammed Aideed, a key contender for national leadership, was identified by Admiral Howe as part of the problem, not part of the solution, and backed by the US and UN, Howe decided to “marginalize Aideed.” Beginning as an effort to reduce his influence, it ended in an all-out attempt to capture him and his senior leadership.¹¹³

The first solid step toward personalizing the conflict and “marginalizing” him was the attack on Aideed's radio station. Although the station had been spewing forth a steady torrent of anti-American and anti-UN propaganda, it had been successfully countered through a US counterpropaganda campaign. Seeing a peaceful approach as more credible, UNITAF and Ambassador Oakly took the stand that it was Aideed's right to broadcast whatever he wished. The US simply fought him with the truth on their own radio station. Their highly successful approach included positive stories using extensive interviews with local Somalis to counter Aideed's lies, often using members of Aideed's own clan to refute him.¹¹⁴

After officially targeting Aideed, though, the war quickly escalated. In addition to Howe's focus on Aideed, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali

continued to make sweeping statements about completely disarming the country. This move threatened every warlord but put special stress on Aideed because of his already high visibility in Mogadishu. Another factor accelerating the rush to open war was the loss of corporate knowledge and experience after the change of command to UNOSOM II and from Ambassador Oakly to Admiral Howe.¹¹⁵ The final catalyst for the open war against Aideed was his 5 June ambush of the Pakistani soldiers, which pushed UNOSOM II irrevocably into bloody confrontation.

But, according to Major General Zinni, the die was cast much earlier. Our attempt to impose a total solution required a clear enemy. When faced with an abstract enemy like lawlessness or brutality, Americans tend to take sides or create a visible enemy. While UNITAF could afford to remain distant, UNOSOM II's ambitious mandate made this approach much more difficult. Was it inevitable? Zinni says yes. Our desire to impose a US/UN solution based on Jeffersonian democracy led UNOSOM II to be too ambitious and dictatorial in its "solution." While in Somalia and believing that "half a glass may be the best we can hope for," our focus on ideal democracy pushed us to reject an unsatisfying Somali solution and ultimately led to failure.¹¹⁶

In hindsight, almost everyone sees singling out Aideed as our enemy to be an overall liability. In the words of end-state planning authority, Col Bruce Clarke, "Even in chapter 7 ops, . . . you must maintain neutrality if you are to avoid becoming involved on the side of a given faction and remain effective." Colonel Clarke adds that the fatally flawed, limited vision of UNITAF left UNOSOM II in a position where neutrality was much more difficult.¹¹⁷ Col Nordbø said it more directly: "UNOSOM II made two big mistakes. The first was to go after Aideed. The second was not to get him."¹¹⁸

Summary

In both the Dominican Republic and Somalia, political considerations affected almost every decision and shaped each military movement. Rules of engagement were critical in both missions. In the Dominican Republic, the imposed, extremely restrictive ROE cost lives, but by the Somalia the process had greatly improved. The ROE were bottom-up rather than top-down, and although interpretation tightened, the rules themselves were constant. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, warns that ROE may not provide detailed guidance; commanders must exercise judgment.¹¹⁹ In the Dominican crisis, this judgment was intentionally removed. In Somalia the latitude not only to commanders, but to junior enlisted men, also was restored.

Even with the wider latitude in Somalia, a few major ROE problems were noted. One involved nonlethal force. Planners must devote more attention to proper response when a bullet is too much. Several UN military advisors warned of the US tendency to see things as "black and white." We must, they insisted, learn to recognize the various shades of gray in peace operations.

According to them, ROE should be "broad policy guidance" which should guide, but not define "orders for opening fire."¹²⁰

A second problem involved inability by some to carry out the ROE. An obvious, but overarching principle is that ROE must be interpreted and implemented uniformly among contingents. This was true neither in the Dominican Republic nor in Somalia. Although each country agreed to the same rules, skill levels and cultural background led contingents to implement them in widely different manners. ONUSAL veteran, Col Pedro Colmenares, insists the "highest standards for selecting troop commanders at all levels and *continuity* in employment policies" (emphasis in original) are essential to peace operations ROE.¹²¹ While FM 100-23's caution that multilateral force contingents will likely operate with different ROE may be exaggerated, ROE will certainly be interpreted differently.¹²² Combined exercises, scenario-based education, and high-quality forces are the only hedges against this problem.

Prisoners remain a volatile and difficult issue. The international legal system has few provisions for "detainees" or prisoners in a peace enforcement action. NORDIC UN training manuals prescribe the quick release without prejudice of any prisoners taken.¹²³ While seemingly foolish or counterproductive, forces in the Dominican Republic and Somalia were compelled to similar practices. In the Dominican Republic, the local police were party to the conflict, and in Somalia there were no civil authorities.

One possible answer to this issue is training and supervision for civil police by some respected international agency as part of any peace operation where national police are either unprepared or undependable. Efforts to rebuild the police system in Panama after Operation Just Cause and in El Salvador may provide some guidance.¹²⁴ However, in any such effort, we must remember that it can not be done overnight. Such efforts are time- and labor-intensive.

The jury is still out on the extent of formal political training needed for peace enforcers. Most agree that formal training for midgrade and senior officers is highly desirable, and many propose orientation and mission-specific training for junior officers and enlisted men. At the highest levels, FM 100-23 recommends a combatant commander's advisory committee to link theater strategy to national policy goals and tie these to the specific objectives of the State Department and individual ambassadors.¹²⁵ During UNITAF, Ambassadors Oakley and Albright and General Johnston seemed to have a very tight and amicable relationship. However, during the transition to UNOSOM II and afterward, the diplomatic and military coordination deteriorated dramatically.

Even among low-ranking personnel, evidence shows that frequently the roles of peace enforcer and diplomat merge. From a Marine lieutenant who defuses a riot in Santo Domingo to an MP captain who sets up a local government in Afgoye, the need for diplomatic and political awareness is evident. Although "good soldier skills" were cited as most critical, the needs don't stop there. At the very least, pre-deployment training should stress overall understanding of the mission, and emphasize negotiation and mediation skills. PME courses should reinforce national strategy and cover

the interrelationships among national and international bodies and these agencies' interfaces with the military. In the future, we should not deploy peace enforcers with a warped view of why they are going or who they work for. The soldiers who arrived in the Dominican Republic ready to "kill Commies" should remain an object lesson in the back of our minds.

The final political issue covered was the US propensity to single out a definitive enemy. This occurred in both the Dominican Republic and Somalia. While *formally* designating Aided as an enemy was beyond the scope of military influence, educating our forces in discipline, respect, and even-handedness was not. Although peace enforcement does not require a pacifist approach, it must be fair. Even unintentional favoring of one side over another can have disastrous effect. In Somalia, we were reduced to "just another faction." For true peace enforcement, such a label is the death knell of effectiveness.

Notes

1. While some have recently referred to actions like the Korean conflict and Desert Storm as "peace enforcement," I reject that categorization. Such operations are wars and have completely different objectives.

2. Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, USA, Bruce Palmer Papers, oral history, 154.

3. Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, USA, Bruce Palmer papers, untitled address to Pan-American Society of New England, 27 October 1966.

4. Dr Lawrence A. Yates, *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966*, Leavenworth Papers Number 13 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 77-78.

5. Col Carlos de Meira-Mattos, Brazilian army, *A Experiência do FAIBRÁS na República Dominicana* (Brasilia, Brazil: Brazilian army, n.d.), 36. (Portuguese)

6. Command Diary, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 28 April-9 June 1965, 4.

7. Palmer, Pan-American Society address, 16.

8. Command Diary, Battalion 1/6, 9.

9. Deputy chief of staff, Brig Gen Frank Linnell recorded in his staff notes for 28 May 1965 that the 82d Division commander Major General York offered to be held "personally responsible" to get authorization for his men to "break out their basic load" of ammunition.

10. Command Diary, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, 28 April-6 June 1965, 4 May 1965, describes "the frustration of the tank gunner who laid his 90 mm on the monument and was only awaiting the word to drop it and its occupants." The occupants were firing directly on a group of Marines with deadly effect, but the order to return fire with the main tank gun never came.

11. Col Steven M. Butler, USA (Ret.), telephone interview with author, 19 January 1994.

12. Yates, 159.

13. Palmer, address to Pan-American Society; and Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, USA, Bruce Palmer papers, draft manuscript of untitled speech to Association of US Army (never presented), October 1965, 10.

14. Command Diary, Battalion 3/6, 6 May 1965.

15. Yates, 142.

16. This incident appears in multiple accounts including Yates, 83-84; Butler interview; and Command Diary, Battalion 3/6, 11.

17. Generals Palmer and York went on record with their complaints to the Organization of American States (OAS) and to the Pentagon about the rules of engagements, but their protests were unanswered. As Lawrence A. Yates phrased the situation, frustration gave way to anger in cases where "civilian and military leaders in Washington appeared to ignore military

considerations completely as they seemingly sacrificed the safety and morale of American soldiers in Santo Domingo on the alter of political considerations." See Yates, 140.

18. Command Diary, Battalion 3/6, 6 May 1965.

19. The only possible reference of any sort during the period is a rather cryptic note by Brig Gen Frank Linnell from the 31 April 1965 staff meeting which says "CG summation—negotiations: NYET!" While it is possible this refers to the American POWs, it more likely is a reference to the Dominican situation in general.

20. Yates, 104; and Butler interview. For an example of the yellow journalism of the period which capitalized on such incidents, see Victor Perlo's *Marines in Santo Domingo*.

21. Yates, 104; and Command Diary, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, S-1 log, 8 May 1965.

22. Col Steven M. Butler, letter to author, 20 May 1994. According to Colonel Butler, tactical military intelligence interrogators did go in 82d Airborne deployments, but 18th Corps prisoner of war interrogators simply "got there without being asked"—a fortunate occurrence. After their arrival, the interrogators waited two days for a mission, finally being told to establish a detainee camp.

23. Yates, 78.

24. In some accounts of the situation, York not only witnessed the cease-fire, he actually signed it. He later denied he had signed the document, but the allegation has never been completely resolved.

25. Yates, 178.

26. Maj Jack K. Ringler, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., *U.S. Marine Corps Operations in the Dominican Republic, April-June 1965* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, USMC, 1970), 66.

27. Yates, 87, 91.

28. Quoted in Yates, 158.

29. This zone was also referred to innocuously in official releases as the line of communication (LOC). Although primarily designed as a demilitarized zone between the two factions, Washington publicized it as a free zone where commerce and traffic could flow unhindered by the conflict. Both sides were right, but the "spin" created by such differing views often colored how the zone or LOC was to be used by the OAS forces.

30. Yates, 121, 131.

31. Palmer oral history, 169.

32. According to the official Brazilian after action report, the Latin American brigade took control of the radio/television station in a hand-off from the Dominican army. See Carlos de Meira-Mattos, *FAIBRÁS*, 46.

33. Ringler and Shaw, 73. Col Steven M. Butler in a 20 May letter to the author, identifies a common theme in such operations. For Lebanon, 1958, Dominican Republic, 1965, Grenada, 1983, the same problem occurred, rapidly changing, multiple missions requiring different force mixes and ROE. The repeated pattern is permissive NEO followed by hostile NEO, followed by peace enforcement, and finally peacekeeping.

34. Ringler and Shaw, 73.

35. Yates, 177.

36. Palmer speech to AUSA, 11.

37. Palmer oral history, 154, 161.

38. Yates, 166.

39. Palmer oral history, 190-91.

40. *Ibid.*, 191.

41. Palmer's political insight stood in stark contrast to that of Major General York, commander of the 82d Airborne Division. According to (then lieutenant) Steven M. Butler, a staff officer, York had little political understanding of the matter and directly violated ROE when he presented unacceptable risks to his troops. On one occasion he noticed a young 2d lieutenant and his men pinned down by Constitutionalist forces and taking cover beneath a vehicle. When he asked the officer why he was not returning fire with the vehicle's 106 mm recoilless rifle, the lieutenant answered that it would violate the ROE. In disgust, York said he would return shortly and did not expect to see the Constitutionalist position standing when he returned. It was not.

42. Yates, 168–69. Politicians and diplomats were also subject to political blindness. Yates points out that the discrepancy between the announced mission (security for US and foreign nationals) and the actual mission (preventing a communist takeover) caused a credibility gap for both the US government and the military. See Yates, 74. Col Steven M. Butler added that in a more tactical sense, Ambassador Bunker could never seem to understand the difference between the Constitutionalist behavior at the peace talks and their actions in the streets. He had a chronic tendency to overlook the latter and concentrate on the good will and genuineness they projected at the peace table. Both the mixed signals from Washington and the rose-colored glasses of the local OAS leadership caused difficulties for the soldier on the street. See Butler interview.

43. Yates, 119.

44. Palmer, draft speech to AUSA, 8.

45. Yates, 142–43.

46. Quoted in Palmer's speech to Pan-American Society, 13.

47. Palmer oral history, 173; and Yates, 73.

48. Palmer, speech to Pan-American society, 17. Note: he goes on to admit that Dominican government ground forces were free to maneuver outside OAS controlled areas.

49. Yates, 117.

50. Command Diary, Battalion 1/6, 28 May 1965; and Command Diary, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, April–June 1965, and 22 and 30 May 1965.

51. Yates, 113.

52. Command Diary, Battalion 3/6, 8, 12–13.

53. Command Diary, Battalion 1/8, 12 May. Col Steven M. Butler said in a 20 May 1994 letter to the author that much of the US's initial HUMINT intelligence came from the Dominican army and police until American intelligence networks were in place. Even later, the US maintained liaison with the Dominican government police and military intelligence services.

54. Although there were certainly Communists within the Constitutionalist ranks, it is by no means certain that they were either "Communist controlled" or an extension of the Cuban revolution as many asserted at the time. Yates cites many instances during the crisis which indicate that the Rebel side was in fact a diverse collection of many disenchanted groups with widely differing agendas and expectations. Many of these groups were disenchanted with the idea of military rule and firmly believed that their democratically elected government had been "stolen" by the military—with the help of the US and OAS.

55. Command Diary, Battalion 1/6, 2 May.

56. Palmer oral history, 173.

57. Command Diary, Battalion 1/6, S-1's log, 6–9 May 1965. However, it is also true that, at least for the first six weeks, Loyalist forces could freely move about much of the city with their arms without fear of restriction by the IAPF. As late as June 1965, they mounted major offensives without opposition from Alvim's and Palmer's troops. It may be true that the government didn't smuggle arms because they didn't have to.

58. de Meira-Mattos, 29.

59. Ibid., 39.

60. UNOSOM II, Appendix 6 to Annex C to UNOSOM II OPLAN 1, "Rules of Engagement (ROE)," 2 May 1993.

61. Lt Col Paul Eaton, USA, interview with author, 23 March 1994.

62. Maj Gen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, telephone interview with author, 14 February 1994—and Major Fountain, USA, telephone interview with author, 27 May 1994.

63. It is interesting that while the US seemed to learn from Lebanon not to wait for higher authority to impose ROE, they did not learn the dangers of being identified as clear enemies of one of the opposing factions—a main reason for the 23 October bombing of the Marine barracks.

64. According to Major Fountain, while acceptance was not universal, it was nearly so, and all major contingents accepted the US ROE. This acceptance was gained, in part, through an aggressive lobbying campaign incorporating a specially designed booklet outlining suggested coalition ROE and rationale for their acceptance.

65. Capt David ("Scotty") Dawson, USMC, interview with author, 21 March 1994, and Dr Robert K. Wright, major, USAR, telephone interview with author, 6 January 1994.
66. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Summary, Operation Restore Hope Army Forces Executive Summary," Tab B, "Integration of Coalition Forces," 1 March 1993, 4.
67. Ibid., 5.
68. Dawson interview; Wright interview; and Fountain interview. Cayenne pepper was used instead of tear gas, because UNITAF officials feared tear gas, used in the confines of Mogadishu and other Somali cities, would cause unnecessary casualties to innocent Somalis.
69. Eaton interview.
70. Wright interview.
71. Col Gary W. Anderson, USMC, interview with author, 8 February 1994.
72. Wright interview. As a result of this procedure, restraint civilian casualties were reduced without sacrificing the safety of UNITAF forces.
73. According to Lt Col Darrell Elmore in a 3 May 1994 lecture to SAAS, many UNISOM II contingents were unwilling to let the sniper teams enforce the rules of engagement. On several occasions, foreign troops interposed themselves between menacing Somalis and the snipers to "de-fuse" the conflict or avoid escalating violence. They were trying to act as peacekeepers in a peace enforcement environment. Often the situation deteriorated even further because of the pacifist stance.
74. Anderson interview; and Wright interview.
75. The term *detainee* is more appropriate than *enemy prisoner of war* (EPW) since no war was in progress and the rules of the Geneva convention for treatment of prisoners were not in force.
76. Wright interview; and Eaton interview.
77. Eaton interview.
78. Dawson interview; and Wright interview.
79. Title 22, US Code, Section 24-20.
80. Dawson interview.
81. Anderson interview; and Wright interview.
82. According to Dr Robert K. Wright of the Joint History Team, the US forces felt at a loss when confronted with vandalism and simple theft. Since there were no police, and the forces themselves were not being directly threatened, they saw no mechanism for punishing the offenders. Eventually they settled on the laughable practice of escorting a captured thief to the edge of the compound, giving him a bottle of water and an MRE, and sending him on his way—hardly an inducement to stop stealing. In contrast, the Moroccan contingent caught only one thief. He was stripped, beaten, and thrown into a pile of concertina wire. There were no additional thefts in the Moroccan compound.
83. Wright interview.
84. The effort under UNISOM II to reestablish a criminal justice system was the only hope for selling this thorny problem. The only alternative answer offered by anyone I interviewed for reestablishing the rule of law in a lawless state was for the UN or some neutral nation to contribute a "judicial system package" which would include police trainers, judges, and prison system workers. This package would observe local law and limit its efforts to reestablishing local authorities in dealing with serious crimes. Many others I asked about this possibility dismissed it as either too hard or legally improper.
85. Eaton interview; and Anderson interview.
86. Anderson interview.
87. Lt Col William J. Martinez, USA, interview with author, 23 March 1994; and Lt Col Charles Borchini, interview with author, 23 March 1994.
88. Ambassador Alexander Borg-Olivier, "The UN in a Changing World Order: Expectations and Realities" (Address to Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Coalition Warfare Conference, Norwich University, Northfield, Vt., 24 February 1994).
89. Eaton interview.
90. Dawson interview.
91. In some cases, geographic constraints took on an odd twist. Rather than restricting the contingent's activity in an area, the force would demand geographic autonomy. According to Dr

Wright of the Joint History Team, the Italians were the main example of this, demanding sole authority in northern Mogadishu because of their previous experience there. They neither asked for, nor wanted, any assistance of American supervision.

92. Eaton interview.
93. Dawson questionnaire response, 3 January 1994; and Eaton interview.
94. Wright telephone interview; and Martinez interview.
95. Anderson interview; and Martinez interview.
96. Col C. R. Prickett, Australian army, interview with author, 25 March 1994 and Col Toralv Nordbø, Norwegian army, interview with author, 25 March 1994.
97. Lt Gen Robert B. Johnston, untitled correspondence with author, 3 May 1994.
98. While some Moslem contingents (such as Pakistan and Morocco) continued to eat and drink normally, taking advantage of a dispensation for wartime operations in the Koran, more orthodox Moslems (particularly those from Saudi Arabia and the UAE) chose to observe Ramadan strictly.
99. Dawson interview; and Wright interview.
100. Dawson interview; and Anderson interview.
101. Martinez interview.
102. Walter Clarke, interview with author, 23 March 1994.
103. Nordbø interview.
104. Zinni interview.
105. Col Richard P. Gray, OBE, New Zealand army, interview with author, 25 March 1994.
106. Martinez interview.
107. Wright telephone.
108. Eaton interview.
109. Wright interview.
110. Dawson interview.
111. A quick synopsis of the chain of events can be found in Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, "Building a Consensus on International Peace-keeping," *U.S. State Department Dispatch*, 15 November 1993, 789.
112. Eaton interview.
113. Anderson interview; and Albright, 789.
114. Borchini interview; and Anderson interview. Colonel Anderson stated that the attack on Aideed's station simply "made him a martyr" and was completely unnecessary since our radio station was quickly winning market share with its better programming. This is eerily similar to the same mistake we made in the Dominican Republic when military and civilian leaders gave up on a slow, but effective psyops counterpropaganda campaign to directly attack the "enemy" radio station.
115. Wright telephone interview. Author's note: This changeover and corresponding loss of corporate knowledge is reminiscent of the similar problem with commanders in Vietnam caused by the "six-month command tours." UN guidelines for rotations of six month or less could institutionalize this mistake.
116. Zinni interview.
117. Col Bruce Clarke, USA, interview with author, 23 March 1994.
118. Nordbø interview.
119. Filed Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations*, 1994, 4-2.
120. Maj Stuart Jeffrey, Canadian Defense Forces, interview with author, 25 March 1994; Gray interview; and Prickett interview. Colonel Prickett offered a partial answer to the changing ROE demands, suggesting wider use of the "red/yellow" card system. Yellow cards specify, "You will not use force unless. . . ." while red cards specify "You will use force if. . . ." This system allows rapid transition between low- and high-intensity peace enforcement operations. It also allows leaders to tailor ROE to specific geographic areas.
121. Col Pedro Colmenares, Colombian army, questionnaire response, 14 January 1994.
122. FM 100-23, 4-5.
123. NORDSAMFN, *NORDIC UN Tactical Manual*, Volume 2 (*Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, Jyväskylä*, 1992), 87.

124. Wright interview; and Jack Child, "Peacekeeping and the Inter-American Military System" (Paper presented at conference on Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Coalition Warfare: the Future Role of the United Nations, Norwich University, Northfield, Vt., 24-25 February 1994), 16.

125. FM 100-23, 3-10.

Chapter 4

Interoperability Issues

In any multinational operation interoperability is critical. In multinational peace enforcement operations, the concern is even larger. Peace operations forces often include nations who are not allies and who may even be enemies. Peace enforcement operations also carry vast political overtones which can hinder unity of vision and certainly reduce unity of command—even more than in other types of coalition operations such as Desert Storm. Interoperability issues affect the areas covered in previous chapters. However, in this chapter, I highlight four interoperability areas permeating peace enforcement operations: equipment and logistics; training and doctrine; intelligence; and language and culture.

Dominican Republic

Equipment And Logistics

Equipment and logistics interoperability is important to any multinational operation. To be effective, a coalition must anticipate and minimize equipment shortages and interface problems. NATO has struggled with this for 45 years, yet has no complete solution. It is small wonder the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) suffered with the same albatross.

In his oral history, Gen Bruce Palmer diplomatically described the equipment and logistics shortfalls among the IAPF, saying only that “some units of the [IAPF] were better equipped and prepared than others. Some were unprepared.”¹ Another veteran was more specific, describing Latin American units as being in “varying degrees of poverty.” Although Brazilian units were adequately equipped, others had nonstandard weapons and old equipment in ill repair. He went on to add sardonically, “Equipment shortfalls were not a problem—the US provided everything.”²

Because of incompatible equipment and doctrine, forces were given separate areas of responsibility, and no operations were integrated below brigade level. Even among the Latin troops, equipment shortages and incompatibilities affected operations. In the Brazilian history, the Latin American brigade commander, Col Carlos de Meira-Mattos, said Nicaraguan and Honduran troops were so ill-equipped, they had to be relegated to brigade reserve and used as security troops in the quiet Dominican countryside. In particular, de Meira-Mattos cited their lack of transportation and communications assets.³

An unforeseen consequence of furnishing Latin American contingents with American equipment was the corresponding training required for proper use. This training required significant time from both contingents, and was complicated by language differences. Although Spanish speaking troops were not too difficult to find, Portuguese speakers were much rarer, so General Palmer used Army special forces extensively as both trainers and interpreters.⁴

Even the Brazilian units—the best equipped of the Latin American contingents—recognized their inadequacies. Several pages of their official history on the operation are devoted to the logistics problems of the Latin American brigade and the Fraternity Battalion. In particular, the lack of a service and command company in each unit was a major disadvantage. In the rush to send combat forces,⁵ essential support units had been left behind.⁶

The first Latin soldiers to arrive, a Honduran company, brought almost nothing.⁷ Fitting them out so depleted US supplies that Palmer wanted no other Organization of American States (OAS) deployments unless they were self-sufficient and equipped to function in the field. Despite this shaky start the operation eventually operated using mainly US equipment and support.⁸ In response to the almost complete lack of Latin American support personnel and to equip the forces with compatible equipment, all IAPF logistics was provided by the 18th Airborne Corps' 5th Logistics Group. The support provided to the Latin American brigade ran the gamut from uniforms and even underwear to 2½-ton trucks. Even aerial photographs were supplied by Brazilians securing the National Palace.⁹

Training and Doctrine

When the Latin American IAPF component was being formed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made it clear they preferred the OAS to provide additional infantry units with training in counter guerrilla and riot control. The US also assumed that most Latin American officers assigned to the combined staff would have had previous professional military education in the United States.¹⁰ As it was, the Latin American troops who arrived displayed a wide variety of basic military skills.

The Brazilian officers who held most of the key Latin American brigade command positions recognized their troops' deficiencies and took immediate steps to raise their proficiency. Although Brazilian troops had been given rigorous training in special peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations before deployment, most other Latin contingents had not.¹¹ While Palmer publicly cautioned his staff not to "rush the cadence" on the Central and South American troops,¹² Brazilian officers put their charges through a "rigorous instruction program." The Honduran and Nicaraguan companies were singled out for special attention, but every unit underwent intensive training each time they rotated into the reserve.¹³

The troops improved dramatically in the first few weeks. After the successful operation to secure the National Palace, spearheaded by Brazilian forces, General Palmer was effusive in his praise. According to Colonel de

Meira-Mattos, the demonstration had finally gained the respect of the United States.¹⁴ Palmer later said (Latin) IAPF troops successfully withstood psychological and military attacks designed to split the US and Latin forces. He cited such psychological ploys as the use of "the prettiest girls in the Constitutionalist area" to tempt the soldiers. When these attempts failed, the Latins withstood direct military attack and "were quite well prepared to defend themselves."¹⁵

Even so, mixed impressions remain. One veteran characterized the non-US troops as "politically unsophisticated," though not undisciplined.¹⁶ In another interesting divergence, while US roadblocks and checkpoints were manned 24 hours a day, at least some of the Latin American checkpoints were only manned from 0600 to 1800 hours each day. Even so, they processed 5,000 vehicles and 20,000 people daily during their first four months.¹⁷ While uneven in training and performance, Latin troops served the IAPF well.

US forces deployed to the Dominican Republic included the highly trained 82d Airborne Division and the Marines of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, afloat. Both were well prepared for small-unit infantry work, and in the month preceding the intervention, the forces had worked together in JCS exercise, Quick-Kick VII. This Caribbean exercise provided important, though serendipitous, training for the intervention. It included urban assault drills and even riot control.¹⁸ Palmer said the main requirement for an operation like the Dominican operation was highly disciplined, light troops with "instinctive reaction to danger, instant obedience, and great restraint under fire."¹⁹

However, other equally necessary skills had not been anticipated. In addition to traffic flow responsibilities, checkpoints were used as food distribution and medical treatment facilities.²⁰ Although the 42d Civil Affairs Company provided special expertise, the bulk of civic action—everything from food distribution to garbage pickup—was performed by Marine and Army infantrymen. As Palmer puts it, "Once the rebels were 'bottled up' in downtown, [the IAPF] turned to bringing in food, water, and medical care."²¹ Troops were also required to show professionalism and courtesy to often hostile civilians without regard to political orientation.²² As mentioned previously this training was received on-the-job or not at all.

Good "soldier skills" were requirements for the Dominican Republic peace enforcer, and the US arrived with those skills. Other nations were less skilled, but all improved after arrival. What seemed most lacking across the IAPF were humanitarian relief-related skills, and the negotiation and mediation training so necessary when working closely among hostile civilians from opposing factions.

Intelligence

Intelligence gathering and dissemination were other critical interoperability areas for Dominican Republic operations.²³ Intelligence gathered in-theater came from a variety of sources including aerial photography and signals intelligence, but most came from human sources. America's coalition partners

had no intelligence assets other than reconnaissance patrols, but a significant amount of information was gleaned from Dominican agents operating inside Constitutionalist areas and from the Dominican government intelligence service. In another demonstration of partisan behavior, the US detailed intelligence liaison officers to work directly with the Dominican army and air force intelligence services.²⁴ Likewise, the Dominican government supplied at least one national police liaison officer cited in Marine diaries as "a continuing source of information and assistance in many areas."²⁵ While this provided information on the Constitutionlists, it served as a visible demonstration of our partiality and discouraged intelligence gathering on the government.

Organic intelligence efforts took advantage of the fact that the effort was not governed by the Geneva Accords and used helicopters painted with red cross symbols to place and supply agents in the countryside. Embassy and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel served as "cover" for their activities.²⁶ In addition to USAID personnel, the US used Peace Corps workers as intelligence sources. They provided valuable information on the rebels, although many were sympathetic to the Constitutionalist cause and resented the US action.²⁷ In particular, the Peace Corps served as vital influence on the powerful, left-leaning Dominican Catholic Church.²⁸

By all indications, sharing between the US and others was primarily one way. Steven M. Butler, a staff intelligence officer, said coalition members were provided only limited information.²⁹ This was partly because of security concerns, substantiated by staff meeting warnings to "protect classified [information] when UN and OAS types were around."³⁰ Intelligence sharing was also complicated by the need to use Spanish or, more often, Portuguese to avoid confusion or misunderstanding.³¹

One of the biggest culturally based intelligence problems occurred not among coalition members, but with US forces themselves. Because of the dearth of Spanish speakers to work with intelligence-interrogation teams, Puerto Rican National Guard troops were used. Some of these troops developed a sympathy with the Constitutionlists, some deliberately misinterpreting responses to interrogators to hide information or protect prisoners.³²

Limited intelligence sharing with coalition members seemed to cause more operational than political fallout. The official Brazilian history contains no complaints about intelligence withholding. Poor intelligence and unwillingness or inability to share caused problems for Latin American and US soldiers, alike. Protecting cryptographic equipment required a completely unsecured radio net.³³ The Dominican Constitutionlists also monitored local telephones, so communications security was never assured. The Dominican counterintelligence database had to be "built from scratch," and poor maps were responsible for many soldiers wandering into hostile areas and being shot or mistreated.³⁴ Unfortunately for the IAPF, the secrecy and protectiveness endemic to intelligence was hard to overcome, and the US

high-tech intelligence machine, built to deal with the Soviets, performed poorly in the Caribbean island nation.

Language and Culture

IAPF forces represented diverse cultures and three distinct languages. These differences presented significant challenges for the OAS contingents. Language differences between the US and other contingents plagued the IAPF throughout the intervention. Very few staff officers spoke Spanish, and almost no one spoke Portuguese. Although many Latin Americans spoke English, it was by no means widespread. In some cases language proficiency was overstated. For instance, army records showed all interrogators could speak Spanish, but many were marginally conversant at best.³⁵ In the combined headquarters, the need for both excellent language skills and staff skills made an almost impossible combination. As a result, the staff was populated with either good staff officers who were monolingual or bilingual officers with poor staff skills.³⁶ Even in a situation where officers achieved conversational standards in a common language, nuances of phrasing caused misunderstandings.³⁷ Nowhere was this more evident than on the roadblocks. Because of the shortage of Spanish speaking troops, checkpoints were often manned by a Dominican policeman or a Latin soldier who could not speak English and an American soldier who could not speak Spanish. Attempts to get additional, bilingual soldiers were only partially successful.³⁸

Culturally, there were difficulties as well. According to one staff officer, the US came across as patronizing to both Dominicans and to their coalition partners. General Palmer felt the Brazilians, for their part, were "very condescending and patronizing" toward the other Latin American contingents and toward the Dominicans.³⁹ This was perhaps foreshadowed when Argentina recalled their contingent after finding out about Brazil's leadership role.⁴⁰ While the common Latin culture helped bridge many gaps among the Latin American brigade troops, there was still some tension.

The cultural superiority US and Brazilian contingents felt toward the Dominicans should not be overstated. Both were well received by much of the populace. Still some criticisms recur in various accounts. General Palmer felt the harshness and abrupt manner of Brazilian troops hurt their ability to do peace operations. For his own part, General Palmer confessed his exasperation with the Dominicans in a letter to Army chief of staff, Gen H. K. Johnson, saying, "These Dominicans are almost impossible to deal with and understand."⁴¹

To foster better understanding, a massive psyops campaign was launched to explain the US presence, and the Marines presented mandatory cultural background lectures on the Dominican Republic to better inform their troops about the country and its people.⁴² In discussing the psyops efforts, Palmer confessed that because of our open society, "we weren't very good at it," but recognized that words were more important than bullets in the Dominican Republic. He later cautioned, "We must think in terms of modern commercial

techniques, in tune with the cultural, technological, and sociological peculiarities of the objective area concerned, and design our equipment accordingly.”⁴³ Despite recognizing the value of words, the US hurt their image by broadcasting propaganda in Santo Domingo claiming to have never given aid to either side. Such transparent lies hurt their believability on other issues.⁴⁴

One particular success story is of the American radio station set up specifically to counter propaganda broadcasts from the Constitutionalist station, Radio Santo Domingo. The US-backed station stayed consciously apolitical, broadcasting only sports and rock music. It quickly became the most popular station in Santo Domingo, winning many friends for the US and the OAS and stealing listeners from the Constitutionalist station through simple entertainment.⁴⁵ This radio station served as a force multiplier for the somewhat tarnished psyops broadcasts which tried to explain the IAPF's presence and enhance the OAS public image.

The Constitutionlists occasionally turned Dominican cultural sensitivities to their advantage. IAPF soldiers were reluctant to search women at roadblocks for fear of inciting a riot, and though female inspectors were requested, they were never provided.⁴⁶ The rebels apparently tried to take advantage of this weakness since Marines checkpoints later reported rebels trying to infiltrate OAS lines dressed as women.⁴⁷

The Constitutionlists also made repeated efforts to drive a wedge between the Latin American and US troops. Beginning with bribes, then moving to taunts, rock throwing, and finally armed probes, the Constitutionlists did everything possible to sew discord among the Latin troops. Though largely a failure, there were isolated examples of rebel sympathizers among the IAPF. After a shoot-out at the Hotel Matúm in the interior town of Santiago between rebels and Loyalist forces, Brazilian rifle grenades and other ordnance were confiscated. A subsequent investigation found they had been sold by Brazilian troops to the Constitutionlists. Though such incidents were rare, they did occur.⁴⁸

The cultural common ground between Dominicans and Latin American OAS forces did pay some benefits. In early talks, the OAS was unable to convince the Dominican government forces to withdraw from their siege of the National Palace. However, when Latin IAPF officers joined the talks, they were able to secure a disengagement. Later, Brazilian forces actually secured the area peacefully.⁴⁹ Palmer also credited General Alvim for personally persuading General Wessin, an intransigent Loyalist army commander, to leave the country for exile in Miami.⁵⁰ This cleared the way for a peace agreement between the Government of National Reconciliation and the Constitutionlists.⁵¹

The US shortage of bilingual troops was a great hindrance to the mission. Likewise our lack of cultural awareness hurt our work with both coalition partners and the local population. However, these deficiencies were recognized and partially compensated for. Though at times the IAPF succeeded by simply “muddling through,” examples like the American radio station and broad-based cultural education lectures showed a conscious effort

to overcome their weaknesses. By recognizing their faults they took the first steps to correct their problems.

Somalia

Equipment And Logistics

In multinational peace operations, equipment and logistic shortfalls should be expected. In Somalia, as in the Dominican Republic, participating contingents arrived with a wide variety of equipment and had varying logistics capabilities. Some arrived with almost no equipment at all. A few were self-sustaining, but most small contingents relied on the United States for almost everything. Even "self-sustaining" units relied on the US for bulk fuel and water.⁵²

At first, some troop supplying contingents were confused about what the US would supply. Many countries, accustomed to having the United Nations reimburse them for participation in peacekeeping operations, expected the US to do the same. Some countries wanted America to pay salaries, and even provide malpractice insurance for their physicians. Most expected the US to provide any heavy equipment such as earth-moving equipment or large trucks.⁵³ Although the US did expect to provide the bulk water and fuel and other substantial sustainment, overall requirements exceeded expectations and eventually became quite a strain on American logistics units.⁵⁴

Even with US support, one of the biggest limitations was the logistics train required to reach the remote interior. The road system was primitive and the rail system nearly nonexistent. Also, since trucks were in demand for so many things including transporting relief supplies, those needed to support troop contingents were often difficult to get. This limited the range many contingents could deploy from the Kismayo and Mogadishu logistics centers.⁵⁵

For NATO and countries such as Australia, which frequently operate with the US, equipment interoperability was not a major problem. Some developing countries however, brought old or unusual equipment.⁵⁶ A prime example is the contingent from Zimbabwe which brought seven old Puma armored cars.⁵⁷ Most nations either supplied their own parts or had signed a memorandum of agreement with the US to provide parts. Some nations did provide extra logistics support outside their own contingents, taking some of the burden from the US. Of particular assistance were theater logistics flights by Great Britain and New Zealand.⁵⁸ Also cited for praise was the contribution of the German logistics unit and the Greek hospital. Although somewhat limited by capability and political restrictions (particularly the Germans), they provided excellent support.⁵⁹

One unforeseen complication of the equipment mix was the variety of fuels required. The US has converted almost entirely to diesel fuel for all vehicles and generators. However, much of the equipment other contingents brought

ran on gasoline. The volume needed to keep this equipment running surprised the logistics planners and required extra effort to meet the demand.⁶⁰

Communications equipment tended to be particularly problematic. The problems ran the gamut from procedural to technological. One of the most basic difficulties was frequency selection. While US forces favor very high frequency (VHF) for most tactical operations, many other countries—particularly African nations—use primarily high frequency (HF) radio. Selecting frequencies for a “common net” was difficult.⁶¹ Even when common frequencies could be found, encryption devices could not be used to secure against intercept. Marines who worked closely with the small contingents operated with unencrypted radios for the entire deployment.⁶² While some relief was obtained by assigning liaison teams with US communications equipment, they were limited by their numbers to mainly tying headquarters units together.⁶³ Some have cited possible value in forces’ use of “clear traffic” as a way to demonstrate openness and even-handedness,⁶⁴ but most saw it as more liability than asset.

Another problem peculiar to the US was the propensity to push “final field-test” equipment to the theater in order to get realistic, field evaluations. Although understandable, it pre-empted some standard equipment which would have been more useful and more interoperable with other forces.⁶⁵ According to one senior Army officer, the diversity of equipment was a major factor preventing integration below the brigade level.⁶⁶ Although the Marines in Mogadishu seemed to defy this pronouncement, it did require extraordinary effort and significant sacrifice in terms of communications security.

Training and Doctrine

Training and doctrine within a coalition need not be uniform for true integration, but it must be compatible. Further, US forces need to know what to expect from other contingents in terms of professionalism and discipline. Non-US contingents represented a wide spectrum in terms of training, and this spectrum broadened over time as new units rotated in and the force gradually shifted to a peacekeeping and humanitarian-relief focus. In the early days of UNITAF, most contingents were elite units. The sending countries, many of whom were first-time contributors, knew their reputations were at stake and sent their very best. However, some nations had few resources to draw from, and their second rotation’s quality was much lower. In particular, Nigeria’s and Pakistan’s replacements were much less prepared than their first United Task Force, Somalia (UNITAF) units.⁶⁷

The biggest single deficiency in follow-on units cited by those interviewed and in written reports was some contingents’ lack of “basic soldier skills.” By this they refer to marksmanship, small unit tactics, patrolling skills, discipline under fire, and other basic infantry skills. Lt Col Paul Eaton, ARFOR G-3, credits poor military training for casualties in Somalia—particularly in the ambushed Pakistani unit.⁶⁸ The Kuwaitis brought weapons which had never been fired and had to have help to set up basic firing ranges.⁶⁹

Although some contingents plainly had training deficiencies, others performed well. According to the Marine Corps historical team, the African nations, though very "low tech," were well regarded by their Marine counterparts, and in the early days of the intervention, had a distinct advantage in their familiarity with the environment.⁷⁰ As time went on, there is evidence to suggest the quality of UNOSOM II troops either deteriorated, or that deficiencies were revealed when high-intensity combat operations were involved after June 1993. The basic combat skills of many of the same contingents praised by the Marines of UNITAF were highly questioned by 10th Mountain Division troops serving with UNOSOM II.⁷¹ The lack of basic skills among peace operations contingents was not peculiar to Somalia. A veteran of UN operations in Cambodia cited similar problems there.⁷²

More data which reveal training and discipline differences can be found in safety observer reports. No safety officer (formal or designated) was found in the vast majority of contingents. Whether directly related to this or not, many serious safety violations were cited which, according to one observer, "exposed US Army personnel and assets to avoidable risks." Serious violations ranged from the dangerous habit of smoking while dispensing fuel, to aircraft entering the traffic pattern at night without notifying the tower.⁷³

Another symptom of poor training in some contingents was the frequent problem with fire discipline and friendly fire incidents. United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Tunisian forces seemed to be most apt to fire without regard to others' safety, but Nigerians were also prone to excessive fire. On one occasion a company of Nigerian soldiers was caught off guard by Somalis at the "K-4" interchange in Mogadishu, and in "clearing the streets," they emptied their weapons and exhausted their entire basic load of ammunition. Fortunately there were few, if any casualties, but the incident did not reflect well on the discipline of Nigerian soldiers.⁷⁴

Other contingents with well-disciplined units often received unwanted and unneeded attention from US assistants. One of the mistakes we made involved the type of forces chosen for liaison officers and the length of time they remained with foreign contingents. In some cases soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group were assigned to European contingents as liaison officers. This was reasonable, since the 10th Group is comprised of European linguists. However, in their training role, they offended many commanders who felt the Americans were trying to teach their highly trained units "how to be soldiers." Once special forces troops with special expertise on Somalia were introduced, they were much better received.⁷⁵

A pragmatic answer to the training issue was offered by Col Nelson Gutierrez of the Colombian army and veteran of UN operations in the Middle East. He noted that the "training level will never be the same among the participating units. The important [requirement] is that each unit perform its mission and be assigned that mission in accordance with its capabilities, equipment, and means."⁷⁶ A Venezuelan veteran of ONUSAL also points out that some minimum level of knowledge common to all participants should be a basic requirement for participation.⁷⁷

A closely related, but separate measure among coalition forces in Somalia was their personal behavior or professionalism. In Somalia, some forces were much more aggressive than others in enforcing certain behavior on the local population. The UN military advisors attributed much of this variance in behavior to the largely conscript forces of many countries. They cited many similar problems in Cambodia and Bosnia where untrained and undisciplined soldiers were serious problems for the UN command.⁷⁸ This lack of discipline can and will be exploited by contending parties who look for the "weak link" in the coalition.⁷⁹ This happened in Somalia where local warlords exploited Pakistani weaknesses. After the 5 June ambush, these soldiers retreated into a defensive perimeter and began "making under-the-table deals" to allow Aideed's men free range within the Pakistani area of responsibility.⁸⁰

Some authorities also had critiques of US procedures in Somalia. Lt Col Paul Eaton noted that Army special forces coalition warfare support teams are called for by Army doctrine, but were not employed. Instead an ad hoc coalition forces support team (CFST) was formed from Marine Corps personnel not specifically trained for such duty.⁸¹ This was primarily because Marine Corps personnel were first to arrive in Somalia and formed the bulk of US forces. The CFST performed well, but it needs to be further institutionalized and trained if it is to be routinely used. Walter Clarke, deputy to US special envoy Robert Gosende, further observed that Marines are expeditionary and not as well suited as the army for long-term, austere conditions.⁸² However, as in the Persian Gulf, Marines were the first troops deployed and were augmented, but never relieved, by more supportable Army forces.⁸³

In that Operation Restore Hope was primarily humanitarian in focus, surprisingly few civil affairs forces were deployed. An Army document reports no National Guard or Reserve teams deployed, only six, four-man teams from the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion. The report went on to say that while the teams did a good job, they were not prepared to do in-depth work (recovery operations in conjunction with nongovernment organizations). They were prepared only as survey teams.⁸⁴ In a related observation, Col Eaton made the case for more civil affairs training for senior noncommissioned officers (NCO) and junior officers. Company and platoon leaders trained formally could pass the training on to their men.⁸⁵ A Marine officer echoed the idea, wondering aloud why Marines seem to be habitually used for these types of missions, but have no civil affairs personnel and so little formal training in those areas.⁸⁶

Still many US officers insist the only training needed for peace enforcement duty is normal combat training augmented by minor, mission-specific training immediately before deployment. Some referred to special peace operations training as "trendy" but unnecessary.⁸⁷ A high level Army briefing admits the need for more emphasis on peacekeeping operations in professional military education for NCOs through senior officers, and four to six weeks of specialized training. The same briefing, though, claims peace enforcement requires no additional education other than on coalition warfare and training to cover only basic war fighting and situation-specific interoperability

issues.⁸⁸ One battalion commander who served in Somalia brought up a problem with such distinctions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, pointing out the same troops often end up performing both missions.⁸⁹

General Zinni agreed that, at the staff level, more emphasis is needed in PME on such matters as planning considerations, interagency coordination, cultural awareness, psyops, and civil affairs, adding that the latter may be the point of main effort.⁹⁰ While finely tuned combat soldiers may be prepared for peace enforcement hostilities, infantrymen may not be the main soldier deployed. As in UNOSOM II, it is often the logistics specialist. These troops must be better prepared as well.⁹¹ The transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement is not well defined, and we must accept that the line will likely be crossed more than once in any given peace operation—just as it was in Somalia.

Can we make any general observations about the compatibility of coalition forces' training? A few observations are offered. After the UNOSOM II staff took over, Lt Col William J. Martinez characterized the state of operations planning as "a low ebb." The staff were unfamiliar with each other, and staff skills were uneven. As in Dominican Republic, even with accurate translation, terminology was a problem. Terms carried various connotations depending on background and training.⁹² An Army Chief of Staff Strategic Fellows briefing points out the need for foreign area officers (FAO) and many, trained liaison officers to overcome this problem.⁹³ Combined exercises will also help reduce problems of procedural unfamiliarity among national commands. Though terminology issues can be reduced with common doctrine, the quality of personnel assigned to peace operations will remain mixed. As Maj Stuart Jeffrey, assistant military advisor to the Canadian UN delegation, puts it, the "more-is-better attitude" ensures overall quality dilution.⁹⁴

Intelligence

In UN peace operations, intelligence is a continuing issue. Whether called intelligence or simply "information gathering," the need for situational awareness remains. In UNITAF, the term *intelligence* was used and even after UNOSOM II took over, the forces recognized the importance of this previously taboo subject. While sensitivity remains about "spying" in the UN community, intelligence is now a more acceptable term than before.⁹⁵

While some intelligence products came from US national assets, they were neither the best nor the most common products. Somalia, like any other developing country, was a classic, human intelligence (HUMINT) environment. However, because of other demands, HUMINT personnel and collection assets were pushed back in the airflow—just as they had been in the Dominican Republic. Even personnel who arrived were without much of their critical, specialized equipment. Still, the biggest single hurdle to effective intelligence collection was a shortage of reliable Somali linguists.⁹⁶

There were some positive points, however. A real effort was made to integrate coalition intelligence efforts to ensure intelligence procedures and requirements compatibility and to find collection gaps among the contingents.⁹⁷ The 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, headquarters for many smaller contingents, held a daily meeting at 1000 with representatives from each contingent to share information and discuss upcoming operations.⁹⁸ In addition to normal HUMINT collection, contingents used some "nontraditional" methods. In some cases HRO members were valuable observers, providing good inputs to the intelligence effort. Though American journalists remained carefully distant, some foreign journalists willingly and, though quietly, regularly provided information to their national contingents.⁹⁹

Despite the different avenues and unprecedented cooperation, many officers rated overall intelligence as poor. They point out that intelligence is perishable, and the release process most intelligence had to undergo before it could be used made it worthless.¹⁰⁰ Another problem lies in HUMINT's nature. It is collected from people who aren't trained observers, and much information is false or misleading. According to Lt Col Charles Borchini, 8th Psyops Battalion commander, many stopped paying attention to humanitarian relief organizations (HRO) reports, due to the false information.¹⁰¹

While the US attempted to open up intelligence to the coalition, distribution often required sanitization procedures, delaying the product and making it much less valuable. Most knew the US had better information than other coalition members, and even among coalition partners, some were more equal than others. This inequity bred some resentment. In seeming paradox, though, one factor which increased security sensitivity was information release. Invariably, someone would reveal "too much," resulting in a backlash of protection.¹⁰² Another commonly cited problem in our ability to share information was the US propensity to label everything *SECRET NOFORN*. Lt Gen Robert Johnston partially solved this by authorizing the relabeling of many products as "releasable RH" (Restore Hope).¹⁰³ Additional problems were created by the use of sophisticated assets to collect data that could have been gathered locally causing fewer dissemination difficulties.¹⁰⁴

Although there were some bright spots in terms of new collection and sharing procedures, many problems encountered in the Dominican Republic and other multinational operations reoccurred in Somalia. The US propensity to push the use of sophisticated collection equipment caused a number of problems. It made the products difficult to sanitize and distribute and delayed the arrival of more effective HUMINT collection assets. HUMINT, while the best source, is also labor-intensive and, without excellent intelligence specialists, prone to misinformation, intentional or not. Much of the information was late, much was ignored, and much was contradictory or false. Intelligence collection and dissemination among coalition forces remains very difficult.

Language and Culture

Though English was the main command and control (C²) language, and most contingents brought many English-speaking officers, English was by no means universally spoken nor understood. When the United States entered Somalia, we made a diligent effort to find Somali speakers, but no systematic effort to locate personnel fluent in other major languages. Our assumption seemed to be that English would be used. A veteran of UN Cambodian operations pointed out similar problems there. While English was a primary C² language for the Cambodian mission, many countries had few English speakers, and as a result many were slow to react to incidents. Those who did understand English were overtasked simply because they understood their orders.¹⁰⁵

Among US forces in Somalia, a particular shortfall was the lack of French speakers. Many forces employed in Somalia used French as their command and control language including the large French, Belgian, and Moroccan contingents.¹⁰⁶ Fortunately, the US had some officers who happened to speak French, but it was purely coincidental if a command had sufficient bilingual officers. For instance, the ARFOR G-3 happened to speak excellent French making possible the close coordination with Moroccan forces, but he was never asked before deployment about his language skills.¹⁰⁷ We often misunderstand language requirements because we tend to categorize forces according to equipment they use (Soviet, US, French) instead of colonial heritage and how that affects their C² structure.

Service doctrine also tended to increase language incompatibility. The US ground forces tended to use artillery personnel for liaison officers because they were available (no artillery mission in Somalia) and because they normally perform liaison duties in US joint operations. However, the artillery units had few bilingual officers, and requirements quickly exceeded their resources. Liaison officers normally had to be field grade officers because of the responsibility and requirement for overall knowledge and experience. However, most majors and lieutenant colonels with language skills were in key leadership positions and could not be released for liaison duty.¹⁰⁸

A final language issue was an overall problem with Somali linguists. While the US made a major effort to contract Somali interpreters, these could only interpret between Somali and English. Coalition officers not fluent in English usually needed a second translation from English to their language. This slowed the process and made some translations highly suspect. A few contingents such as France had their own linguists (usually Legionnaires), but most relied on US-provided interpreters.¹⁰⁹

Beyond language problems, cultural and religious issues caused some problems. Just setting up areas of responsibility and contingent boundaries proved to be tricky. Often the Joint Task Force headquarters was surprised by the way forces aligned themselves. Despite a common C² language, Tunisians and Moroccan forces preferred not to work under the French. The Tunisians worked well with the US Army, while the Moroccans were most comfortable

operating independently. The Greeks and Turks were never expected to be co-located. While General Johnston expected the Greeks to work best with the Italians, they actually ended up with the French. As Johnston said, "overall [it's] a complex and critical process."¹¹⁰ Compatibilities were sometimes even bigger surprises. Most expected the Pakistanis and Indians to have real problems, but they worked together very well, using English as a common language. Likewise an unexpectedly close relationship developed between Turkish and Pakistani forces because of a common religious link.¹¹¹

Another complicating factor in force placement was the preference of the Somali people. The Somalis in Marka were reluctant to accept Pakistani troops, fearing Pakistanis would allow Islamic fundamentalists to take over. In Baidoa, the Somalis preferred the US and later the Australians. In some outlying areas, Somalis specifically requested American troops and asked that neither French nor Italians be stationed nearby. Conversely, in other areas, Somalis preferred French or Italians.¹¹² Again there were surprises. We expected some difficulties with the Italians in Mogadishu because of their colonial past, but their strong and continuing business ties and the quality of Italian forces turned out to be more important than colonial problems. According to Johnston, during UNITAF, "both the French and Italian contingents were very effective in their respective areas of operations and overcame preconceived biases."¹¹³

Some religious and cultural factors affected operations directly. Several sources mentioned the general lack of sensitivity among American officers. They seemed unaware that almost all foreign officers had been hand-picked for the assignment. Most coalition officers had extensive schooling—often at NATO or US schools, and almost all spoke daily with their national command authorities.¹¹⁴ Some Moslem contingents also had problems assimilating with other cultures or had specific religious factors impairing their performance. Many Arabs were uncomfortable with the important role women play in the US military. They were often offended by the dress and behavior of female soldiers, and some were offended by having to work directly with female officers.¹¹⁵ Some devout Islamic contingents were reluctant to support non-Islamic relief agencies,¹¹⁶ and religious holidays also caused some inconvenience. As previously mentioned, during the month of Ramadan the effectiveness of Moslem forces from the Arabian peninsula (a significant portion) was significantly reduced. They were not forbidden to work, but their strict observance of Ramadan led to a ban on drinking water or eating during daylight hours, dramatically reducing their work capacity.¹¹⁷ Similar problems were experienced in Cambodia where Moslem and Buddhist holidays significantly affected performance.¹¹⁸

Despite the wide array of language and cultural problems, each issue was met and at least partially solved. This can be attributed largely to the desire contingents had to work together and get the job done. Not only were they committed to working with the US, but in most cases were willing to put aside past differences and work with each other.¹¹⁹ Some contingents made good use of inherent bilingual skills. The Canadians, with their many French

speakers, arrayed their forces so that English-speaking Canadians adjoined US positions while French Canadians adjoined French positions. Belgium, likewise, made use of their French skills in interfacing with Moroccan and French units.¹²⁰

The US military is also taking steps to reduce future cultural and language problems. One Army report emphasized the need to make coalition forces at ease and to make them feel they "pull their own load."¹²¹ Particular efforts are underway to ensure future operations have fewer language problems. The Army is beginning to track language skills within each unit. A unit personnel officer can then identify his unit's language capabilities and its weaknesses to make assignments and request additional support.¹²²

Another side of the language and culture issued involved interfaces between peace enforcement contingents and the local Somali population. The biggest single factor in friction between UNITAF and UNOSOM forces and Somalis was the lack of cultural understanding in both directions. The Somalis can be divided into two basic groups: the Sahb who are farmers, and nomadic Somals. The Somals have a history as slavers and look down on all other Africans (including the Sahb) as racially and culturally inferior. As a result, Nigerians, Botswanans, Zimbabweans, and even black Americans were poorly received as peace enforcers or peace keepers.¹²³ The Sahb, who felt Restore Hope was their first real chance in 200 years for change, were particularly disenchanted by UNOSOM II's ultimate acceptance of Aideed as a power figure in Somalia.¹²⁴

Cultural ignorance worked both ways. The inability of foreign forces to recite multiple generations of their genealogy confused the Somalis. To them genealogical knowledge and civilization were closely linked, so in Somali eyes, we were illiterate. To some extent this was accurate, since understanding the clan structure was central to understanding Somalia, and our knowledge of the clans and their history was generally poor. As Col John Wood phrased it, "IPB [intelligence preparation of the battlefield] involved clan structure awareness."¹²⁵

Another aspect of the US military response which confused Somalis was our tendency to avoid gradual escalation. American forces tended in most cases to be incredibly tolerant (as in our endurance of rock throwing). In cases where Americans did react, though, the use of force seemed contradictory. Again, this can be partially attributed to US forces' inability to effectively employ nonlethal force.

The US was also politically naive in many ways. The senior DoD intelligence officer who worked with the JCS planners said no one had asked him about the Somali political structure.¹²⁶ While we seemed to understand clan structure was important, we tended to see Somali society through Western eyes. Our attempts to deal with Aideed personally rather than by making him an outcast in the eyes of his clan is a prime example. Somalis universally think of conflict not as personal but as a clan-versus-clan issue. When Howe singled out Aideed to be the target, the UNOSOM II force became another clan. Even Howe's pursuit of democracy for Somalia is confusing.

During his first six weeks, he delegated all political action—including the democratization of Somalia—to his deputy, Lensana Kouyate. Kouyate, from the African country of Guinea, was probably well intentioned, but came from a nation with absolutely no democratic tradition.¹²⁷

In a few areas, though, UNITAF and UNOSOM II forces had considerable success. Some Arab contingents succeeded by working directly with Somali clerics, who as Moslems, were required to speak Arabic. Aware of the Moslem heritage, US forces were proactive in assuring natives their purpose was not to convert them to Christianity.¹²⁸ One of the biggest successes were the contracted Somali interpreters from the United States. Although limited to English translation, they provided keen insight on Somali culture as well as language. These interpreters, many of whom were Washington, D.C., cab drivers, also interpreted body language and facial gestures—not only of Somalis to Western troops, but vice versa. They were able to explain to Somalis the body language (frustration, anger, etc.) of the Americans, which would otherwise have gone unappreciated. Two-way understanding was important. The Somalis needed to know what we thought and felt as much as we needed to understand them.¹²⁹ Clearly language skills and cultural knowledge are important. Our ability to work effectively with multinational forces in unfamiliar areas of the world depends on improvement in these areas.

Summary

Peace enforcement actions in the Dominican Republic and Somalia as well as other multinational operations provide significant implications for logistics. In the nearly 30 years since the Dominican crisis, not much seems to have changed. The US is still expected to provide the bulk of supplies and equipment. We should therefore be especially cognizant of the demand for our logistical capacity. Such support and support units must be planned and given airflow priority. The rush to send combat capability must not cloud our vision as it did in 1965, when US forces were surprised by both their coalition partners' poverty and their own requirement for something as basic as long-range communications.

Even with forces who can supply their own parts and other support, the US and a few capable allies will likely need to provide extensive air or sealift support. The US will probably continue to be the major supplier of bulk water and fuel for all contingents including those from developed nations. While a certain amount of assistance may be provided by Germany, France, and Canada, the lion's share will remain the responsibility of the US. The lesson here is simply to be ready for such requirements. If they cannot be avoided, they must be anticipated. Airlift for foreign contingents must be factored into the time-phased deployment data and all subsequent plans.

If we are to provide bulk fuel, we must understand that many forces still rely on gasoline. The US may be unable to provide large amounts of gas in

future operations because of our conversion to diesel. The dilemma may be solved through a combination of the following methods. We can aid in other forces' conversion from gasoline to diesel fuel through foreign aid programs. We can also plan, in conjunction with coalition partners, to contract with commercial gasoline suppliers where feasible, or we can plan to furnish the majority of vehicles and generators. None of these solutions is cheap. In the end, we may find that supplying forces with our vehicles is more economical than having to bring in large quantities of gasoline. Refusing to supply gasoline would either cause fewer nations to participate or they would come without their vehicles.

Many nations have old or obsolescent equipment. We must be sure to involve liaisons from our embassies early in the process to know what type of equipment will be involved and the support needed. As more nations equipped with Soviet and Chinese equipment participate in operations, the need to coordinate early for support will be even greater. As with the fuel issue, it may be more advantageous to loan US equipment and discourage contingents from bringing their own. However, as in the Dominican Republic, we would need to factor in local training time. Any solution hinges on early awareness, planning, and realistic assessment of our likely responsibilities.

Problems in linking the electronic battlefield in multilateral force operations will probably grow in the future. As Lt Gen Paul G. Cerjan puts it, "The information revolution is not shared equally around the world and will probably cause increasing tension as differences grow."¹³⁰ To mitigate growing logistics diversity among contingents, the UN has begun developing common logistics doctrine for peace operations. Further, they have started to integrate the Field Operations Division (FOD) into the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The FOD is responsible for personnel, logistics, and financial administration.¹³¹

Training, like equipment, will be a mixed bag. In both the Dominican Republic and Somalia, the overarching need was "good soldier skills." We must do everything possible to encourage nations to furnish highly trained soldiers and airmen. At the same time we must be careful not to prejudge the quality of forces from developing countries. In the Dominican Republic our poor opinion of Brazilian troops gave way to respect. In Somalia, some of the best troops came from small African countries. However, these nations may be able to field only a limited number of quality men and women, so later rotations should be evaluated closely.¹³²

The verdict is still out on special peace operations training. Most authorities agree though on the need for additional emphasis on cultural factors, political interfaces and processes, negotiation and mediation skills, and civil affairs-related tasks. Many insist this education and training should filter down to the very lowest levels, but all seem to agree that at least mid- and senior-grade officers should receive additional emphasis in these areas.

The role of intelligence in multinational peace operations continues to grow. This forces us to reassess intelligence gathering and dissemination policies. Sanitizing classified products will continue to be necessary, but we must

ensure information is not so highly protected that it is unusable. One way to avoid overclassification is to use low-level collection assets when possible. The best collection in the Dominican Republic came from personal, HUMINT contact.¹³³ In Somalia HUMINT was also the largest source and much came from sources such as reporters and relief workers. In both operations, HUMINT assets were delayed in favor of "trigger-pullers." In Somalia, HUMINT personnel and equipment were also displaced by high-tech, final production test items. These mistakes should not be repeated. HUMINT collection will continue to be vital for mission success and deserves emphasis in both airflow and follow-on support.

Finally, with regard to language and culture, education is the key. The US Army's foreign area officer (FAO) program provides critical culture and language expertise. Unfortunately the FAO program is a victim of overall force reduction. Army special forces units are also key sources of language and cultural knowledge, but overall, the US military lacks formal programs to create and maintain pools of qualified officers. The services have taken important initial steps to locally track special language skills, but these efforts need more emphasis.

A governmentwide database could draw on special cultural and language skills of not only DoD personnel, but also Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs Service, and Federal Bureau of Investigations personnel who could provide important additional skills and insight. Such a database does not currently exist, but should be created. Another step would be to require all officers to have a working knowledge of some foreign language (fluency for intelligence officers), providing an organic pool of bilingual personnel. While an additional burden, the payoff would be significant.

The world we live in is increasingly multilateral with fewer common enemies and more likelihood to require peace operations in remote areas of the world. By improving interoperability with our coalition partners, we multiply our capabilities. The US will not be involved in every operation, but when involved, we will probably be joined by many other nations. Our ability to function successfully is completely dependent on our capacity to function together.

Notes

1. Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, Bruce Palmer papers, oral history, 183.
2. Col Steven M. Butler, USA (Ret.), telephone interview with author, 19 January 1994.
3. Col Carlos de Meira-Mattos, Brazilian army, *A Experiência do FAIBRÁS na República Dominicana* (Brasilia, Brazil: Brazilian Army, n.d.), 28. (Portuguese)
4. Butler interview.
5. The neglect of support units for combat troops was in direct response to a US request to Latin American participants for primarily combat troops with riot-control training.
6. de Meira-Mattos, 86.
7. Dr Lawrence A. Yates, *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966*, Leavenworth Papers Number 13 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 148. As quoted in Yates, the USFORDOMREP reported of the Honduran

company, "The unit's total organizational equipment consisted of a still crated [field] kitchen it had never seen before." Additionally, each Honduran soldier brought only a rifle, 20 rounds of ammunition, a poncho, a mess kit, and the clothes on their backs.

8. Yates, 148-49.

9. de Meira-Mattos, 25. The Latin contingents were not alone in equipment shortfalls. In the early days of the deployment the Army and Marine units were crippled by a lack of long-haul communications. For the first few weeks General Palmer was almost totally dependent on an Air Force C-130 "Talking Bird" communications aircraft for all communication with Washington. This was especially inconvenient since his headquarters in Santo Domingo was miles from the aircraft. Palmer even used ham radio to talk with the off-shore Navy and Marine units, since Army radios were unsuitable and Marine Corps assets were too short range to reach the ship. Additionally, interservice rivalry likely caused CINCSRIKE's refusal even to authorize the use of assets from the Joint Communication Support Element which had appropriate communications equipment to link Palmer with both the ships and his distant headquarters. After several weeks, Defense Communication Agency finally supplied the needed capability. See Yates, 110-11.

10. Yates, 147, 149.

11. Col Vicente Ferreira-Filho (Brazilian army), questionnaire response, 23 November 1993.

12. Brig Gen Frank Linnell, USA, Frank Linnell Papers, staff meeting notes, June 1965.

13. de Meira-Mattos, 29.

14. Ibid., 26.

15. Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, USA, untitled address to Pan-American Society of New England, 27 October 1966.

16. Butler interview.

17. de Meira-Mattos, 29.

18. Yates, 56; and Command Diary, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, 28 April-6 June 1965 and 5 May 1965.

19. Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, USA, draft manuscript of untitled speech to Association of US Army (never presented), undated, 11. In a somewhat partisan statement, Palmer said the airborne soldier epitomized these characteristics.

20. Yates, 65.

21. Palmer oral history, 173.

22. Yates, 135, 139.

23. Much could be written about the problems within the US intelligence community, but I will ignore that portion of the issue other than to say that, in general, the intelligence provided from outside theater to the forces on the ground was old, sparse, and of poor quality. The US agencies involved included the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Defense Information Agency, and military service intelligence. None of these agencies seemed to cooperate with one significant exception: Local military intelligence officers spoke highly of the support they received from Spanish-speaking FBI agents whom they saw as "bailing out the CIA." See Yates, 103; and Butler interview.

24. Yates, 103; and Butler interview.

25. Command Diary, Battalion 3/6, 29 April 1965.

26. Yates, 107-8.

27. Ibid., 103.

28. Palmer oral history, 176.

29. Butler interview.

30. Linnell, staff meeting notes, June 1965.

31. Butler interview.

32. Yates, 104-5; and Butler interview. Colonel Butler added that active duty Puerto Rican soldiers had no such problems, because "after getting shot at a few times" by Constitutionalist sympathizers, they were not inclined to protect them.

33. Butler interview.

34. Yates, 102-4. According to Butler, Army forces initially used commercial Esso road maps in Spanish with outdated street names. The Marines used a photocopy of a city map

taken from the back of a restaurant menu. Later, these were replaced with high-quality maps based on USAF photo-reconnaissance.

35. Yates, 104.
36. Ibid., 154.
37. Butler interview.
38. Yates, 128.
39. Butler interview; and Palmer oral history, 187.
40. Yates, 147.
41. Palmer oral history, 185, 187.
42. Command Diary, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, April–June 1965, S-1 log, 11 May 1965.
43. Palmer, manuscript of speech to AUSA, 14.
44. Yates, 138.
45. Palmer oral history, 192.
46. Yates, 128. With typical American ingenuity, some sentries began using mine detectors as a way of searching females without touching them. Interestingly, Cambodian peacekeepers were also required to use metal detectors extensively as non-intrusive search tools. Major Partington of the Ghanaian army and veteran of the Cambodian operation said lack of ability to properly operate metal detectors was a real problem in that operation.
47. Command Diary, Battalion 1/6, S-1 journal, 4 May 1965.
48. Butler interview. The results of the investigation were buried to avoid embarrassment to Brazil and the OAS.
49. Yates, 157; and de Meira-Mattos, 25–26.
50. A Dominican government post was invented for the general in Miami to remove him gracefully from the domestic political scene.
51. Palmer oral history, 180.
52. It is an indictment of the US Meal, Ready to Eat (MRE) that no one other than Americans would eat them—even the poorest countries found other alternatives.
53. Maj Gen Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, telephone interview with author, 14 February 1994; and Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Summary, Operation Restore Hope Army Forces Executive Summary, tab B, Integration of Coalition Forces,” 1 March 1993, 3.
54. Lt Col William J. Martinez, USA, interview with author, 23 March 1994.
55. Zinni interview.
56. Col Gary W. Anderson, USMC, interview with author, 8 February 1994.
57. These are not to be confused with the common Puma armored vehicle. The Zimbabwean vehicle used a 7½ ton Mercedes chassis and a locally (Zimbabwean) manufactured body. Parts could be obtained only in Zimbabwe. According to Dr Robert K. Wright, five of the cars they brought were the only working Pumas in the entire country. Two others the Zimbabweans *thought* they could get running after arriving in Somalia were towed aboard transport aircraft and brought as well.
58. Lt Col Charles Peterson, USAF, telephone interview with author, 3 May 1994.
59. Zinni interview.
60. Dr Robert K. Wright, Maj, USAR, telephone interview with author, 6 January 1994.
61. Ibid.
62. US Army personnel confiscated at least two high frequency radios which had been used to intercept UNITAF communications. They warn in a “lesson-learned” by the Combined Arms Assessment Team that we should not underestimate the capabilities of developing nations to intercept our communications. See Major Hickson, “Example of Somali Electronic Warfare Capability,” JULLS 11536-10400, 15 January 1993.
63. Capt David A. (“Scotty”) Dawson, USMC, interview with author, 21 March 1994; and Martinez, interview.
64. Col John R. Wood, USA, “Peace Operations: An Army Review” (Address to Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Coalition Warfare Conference, Norwich University, Northfield, Vt., 25 February 1994).
65. Wright interview.

66. Lt Gen Paul G. Cerjan, "The United States in Multilateral Peacekeeping: The Challenge of Peace" (Address to Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Coalition Warfare Conference, Norwich University, Northfield, Vt., 24 February 1994).
67. Wright interview.
68. Lt Col Paul Eaton, USA, interview with author, 23 March 1994.
69. Capt David A. ("Scotty") Dawson, questionnaire response, 3 January 1994.
70. Ibid.
71. Martinez interview.
72. Maj George Partington, Ghanaian Armed Forces, questionnaire response, December 1994.
73. Mr Mushtare, "Lessons Learned (Integration of Coalition Forces)," JULLS 12015-12554 (00047), 20 January 1993.
74. Dawson interview; and Wright interview.
75. Wright interview.
76. Col Nelson Gutierrez, Colombian army, questionnaire response, 25 January 1994. (Spanish)
77. Col Pedro Colmenares, Venezuela, questionnaire response, 14 January 1994. (Spanish)
78. According to the UN military advisors I spoke with, Bulgaria sent "criminals recruited off the street" to Cambodia, who, in one particularly bad incident, became embroiled in a conflict with local Cambodian authorities. They had tried to take over and run a local house of prostitution. In Bosnia, Col Richard P. Gray personally witnessed Nigerian conscript soldiers who had to be ordered to perform even basic tasks. They had no initiative and resented authority.
79. Maj Stuart Jeffrey, Canadian Defense Forces, interview with author, 25 March 1994; Col Richard P. Gray, OBE, New Zealand army, interview with author, 25 March 1994; and Col C. R. Prickett, Australian army; interview with author, 25 March 1994.
80. Anderson interview; also Martinez interview.
81. Eaton interview; and Dawson interview.
82. Walter Clarke, interview with author, 23 March 1994.
83. This is a lesson from the Dominican Republic that we forgot. There, the Marines were the first to arrive, but once the 82d Airborne troops arrived and were established, the Marines reembarked and were available for other hot spots.
84. Lt Moase, USA, "Special Operating Forces—Civil Affairs," JULLS 12457-88301 (00112), 24 January 1993.
85. Eaton interview.
86. Dawson interview. This concern was also cited by Marine historians after the Dominican crisis.
87. Anderson interview; Dawson interview; Stuart interview; Prickett interview; and Gray interview.
88. Briefing, Strategic Fellows, chief of staff of the Army, subject: "Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement," slides 43A, 44A, 6 January 1993.
89. Martinez interview.
90. Zinni interview.
91. Wood address.
92. Martinez interview.
93. Strategic Fellows, chief of staff of the Army, slide 25A. The army had a good solution with its foreign area officer program, but faced with tight budgets, "killed it to save 'warriors.'" He added that bringing it back will take years. Col Steven M. Butler, letter, 20 May 1994.
94. Jeffrey interview.
95. Prickett interview; and NORDSAMFN. *NORDIC UN Tactical Manual*, 2 (Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, Jyväskylä, 1992), 36, 37. The NORDIC UN manual refers casually to aerial surveillance and satellite imagery.
96. Lieutenant Colonel Joyce, USA, "Force Protection/Counterintelligence Operations," JULLS 11270-75941 (00107), 14 January 1993.
97. Lieutenant Colonel Joyce, USA, "Integration of Coalition Forces/Intelligence," JULLS 12142-94679 (00108), 21 January 1993.
98. Dawson response.
99. Wright interview.

100. Martinez interview; and Wright interview.
101. Borchini interview.
102. Prickett interview.
103. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Integration of Coalition Forces," 4; and Dawson, questionnaire response.
104. Wright interview.
105. Partington response.
106. Wright interview.
107. Eaton interview.
108. Major Furney, USA, "Liaison to Coalition Forces," JULLS 11446-58873 (00142), 14 January 1993; and Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Integration of Coalition Forces," 3.
109. Martinez interview.
110. Lt Gen Robert Johnston, USMC, untitled correspondence with author, 3 May 1994.
111. Martinez interview.
112. Johnston correspondence; Martinez interview; and Dawson interview.
113. Johnston correspondence.
114. Dawson questionnaire response; and Wright interview.
115. Dawson questionnaire response.
116. Wright interview.
117. Dawson interview. Captain Dawson pointed out that other Moslem countries such as Turkey and Pakistan were less affected by Ramadan. They implemented a "dispensation" from the Koran which loosened restrictions during time of war.
118. Partington response.
119. Wright interview.
120. Ibid.
121. Captain Elwood, USA, "Integration of Coalition Forces," JULLS 12144-65206 (00156), 21 January 1993.
122. Eaton interview. Other Army officers I spoke with were highly skeptical of this program, since such tracking has been pushed for before with little result.
123. Dawson interview.
124. Clarke interview.
125. Wood address; and Wright interview.
126. Clarke interview.
127. Ibid.; and Anderson interview.
128. Dawson interview and questionnaire response.
129. Wright interview.
130. Cerjan address.
131. Col Steven R. Rader, USA, *Strengthening the Management of UN Peacekeeping Operations: An Agenda for Reform* (Oslo, Norway: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier (IFS), 1994), 2.
132. Rader proposes a possible way to increase the overall level of training and discipline and to recognize problems before they reach the critical stage. He proposes the establishment of a United Nations Inspector General. This inspectorate would ensure uniform standards of training and professional conduct. Colonel Rader envisions as a logical extension a similar staff element in the headquarters of each peacekeeping organization to act on behalf of the local force commander or civilian leader in charge. See Rader, 6-8.
133. Butler says the best intelligence came from interrogation of detainees, line-crossers, and, later, from low-level informant networks. Also helpful were reports from Spanish-speaking intelligence personnel who were sent to specific areas for collection. See, Col Steven M. Butler, letter, 20 May 1994.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The United States will likely continue its involvement in peace operations for the foreseeable future. Our capabilities and responsibilities as the world's remaining superpower would probably draw us in even if our collective conscience did not. Our involvement is even more likely in peace enforcement operations with their need for larger forces and associated logistics requirements and demand for forces trained and equipped for both combat and humanitarian missions.

America may continue to perform certain sole-source humanitarian operations, but the potential of our unilateral involvement in a peace enforcement mission is exceedingly remote. To ensure adequate domestic and international support for such an operation, a number of nations will also need to supply major contingents. These contingents will likely need to include Western powers such as Canada and France who can add substantial capability. But they will also need to include a number of regional players to show a sense of local unanimity with the operation. In the Dominican Republic we expected some Central American governments to participate,¹ and in Somalia we required participation of three African nations and three regional countries (either Arab or African) before the US would agree to a significant role.² Similar requirements will almost certainly be found in future missions.

While multinational peace enforcement operations could be mounted under regional authority, most will be conducted under United Nations (UN) auspices. If prone to combat, the need for more US forces and the inherent desire to keep such forces under US control will probably lead to a force under US leadership, but under UN sanction. Any regional organization will also need to operate under the approval, if not open control, of the UN. Even in the Dominican Republic where the Organizations of American States (OAS) (under US influence) refused UN control, the UN maintained an influence and participation which could not be ignored.³ Even for a regional organization to take on a major peace enforcement mission, it would have to have financial and probably material support from a major Western power or from the UN. Most regional organizations have neither the financial capacity nor force structure to conduct peace operations. Even North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), often cited as a possible alternative to the UN for regional matters, lacks the necessary political and diplomatic component.⁴ Thus we can expect almost all peace enforcement operations to fall either into the UNITAF mold as a US-led, UN-sanctioned coalition, or UNOSOM II, a UN-controlled force.

UN forces need an improved command structure for effectiveness. The UN has already made strides toward improving their Command and Control (C²) capabilities. These include creating a 24-hour situation center with the beginnings of real control ability and increasing the capabilities of the UN military advisor and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.⁵ More remains to be accomplished. The UN needs a standing, deployable headquarters and earmarked forces which exercise with and are familiar with the UN headquarters' structure. The headquarters must be adequately staffed and equipped to step in as soon as a UN mandate dictates. The hand-off from UNITAF to UNOSOM II is a negative example that should not be repeated.

Humanitarian agencies ought to be brought into closer cooperation with the peace operation's leadership. Humanitarian relief organizations (HRO) can not function effectively in a nonpermissive environment like Somalia or Bosnia if they remain "lone wolves." Despite the antithesis many of these organizations feel toward the military, they must become partners. Peace enforcement and nation building must go hand in hand if lasting peace is to be achieved. To gain such a symbiosis, the HRO must be familiar with the military and political organizations and with their method of operation. The reverse is also true. Again, the best way to gain such knowledge is through combined exercises involving relief agencies and military forces. These could be staged in areas of the world requiring real assistance, but in a passive environment so cooperation skills could be gained in security. When actual peace enforcement operations are required, HRO must be required to cooperate with the UN or UN-sanctioned authorities. This could be accomplished simply by denying services to those who refuse to cooperate. For peace enforcement to succeed, the command structure must be robust and experienced, and all associated political and humanitarian components must work together, not at cross purposes.

Regardless of precaution or preparation, however, political constraints will always affect multinational peace missions. In the violence-prone atmosphere of peace enforcement, this is even more certain. Nations will restrict their forces in certain geographic or operational fashions and dual lines of command will be the norm, not the exception. The only way to minimize such impacts is through awareness, education, and planning.

National restrictions on contingents should be identified before the operation begins. When troop contributing nations are first identified, every effort must be made by the political authorities to designate the limits within which the forces will be allowed to work. Such limits should be plainly discussed with the sponsoring organization (e.g., UN) before the operation is mounted and forces deployed. Within theater, the force commander should carefully evaluate each unit and build his force around actual (not ideal) capabilities and limitations of the force. The work of the coalition forces support team employed in Somalia is a good example of how this can be done effectively. This systematic methodology for determining the limitations and strengths (both militarily and politically) is also endorsed in the 10th Mountain Division report of the UNITAF operation.⁶

The evolution of the rules of engagement (ROE) from the Dominican Republic to Somalia demonstrates significant improvements. The ROE for UNITAF were some of the best ever employed in a peace enforcement operation in terms of protecting both peace enforcers and the population. The ROE were generated by the military with constant scrutiny and well-defined feedback from the field. The military attorneys who crafted the ROE, walked the streets of Mogadishu, and had a chance to see exactly how the rules should be revised or strengthened. Many coalition members who participated in Cambodia and Bosnia were pleased by the contrast with ROE in those operations that they felt had tied their hands and endangered their forces.⁷

However, the ROE in both the Dominican crisis and in Somalia shared a common problem. Detail on the application of non-lethal force was neglected to the detriment of both safety and property. The combination of the need for such force and the lack of guidance led to imaginative solutions among the force contingents. The application of nonlethal force was therefore haphazard and nonuniform, ranging from passivity in some forces to near-lethal beatings in others. Guidance on application of nonlethal force should not place undue restrictions on the ability of peace enforcers to protect themselves, but it must not be neglected. Beyond this criticism, the ROE process in Somalia should be considered a model for future operations.

Another common thread between operations in Somalia and the Dominican Republic is the need for awareness of the mission's overall political objective. This knowledge should be shared by forces at every level of command. More exact knowledge of political interfaces and delineation of responsibilities may be limited to certain organizational levels, but everyone needs to know the purpose of the operation and have a working knowledge of the cultural, ethnic, and organizational environment in which they are to operate. Beyond general knowledge, certain skills are widely required, including mediation and negotiation skills, language skills, and certain civil affairs skills.

This knowledge of the politics and overall objectives may reduce the need to strike out at a particular group or faction. The forces in the Dominican Republic arrived and convinced them that the Communists were the enemy. They quickly linked the Constitutionalist faction to the Communist threat and "chose sides." Later, no emphasis on strict neutrality could reverse these early decisions, and the choosing of an enemy continued to cause problems in both the image and conduct of operations.

In Somalia, many linked abandonment of neutrality to the later tragedies of June and October 1993. The choice of an enemy led to the unnecessary attack on Aideed's radio station. Although American PSYOPS forces had been successful in refuting the station's propaganda by using a more popular coalition station, the UNOSOM II leadership eventually lost patience and lashed out. Had Aideed's station been allowed to become irrelevant rather than a "martyr-maker," UNOSOM II's diplomatic agenda might have been realized.

While strict neutrality does not require being passive, it does require even-handedness. A peace enforcement operation should not take sides and should be wary of unnecessary hostility leading to unavoidable later

consequences. Just as the abandonment of neutrality in Beirut ultimately led to tragedy in 1983, offensive operations in Somalia a decade later gained nothing and resulted in a near-collapse of UNOSOM II. While we may be unhappy with local political figures, we may have only a choice between "half a loaf" or none at all. In Somalia, our targeting of Aideed was ultimately futile, costly in time and lives, and made the UN force just another clan.

Just as a peace operation is often presented with a less-than-ideal cast of host-country political figures, the force will probably represent an eclectic group of national contingents. These contingents will represent a spectrum of equipment, capabilities, and training. Foreknowledge is again the main defense against incompatibility.

The US was the major supplier of troops, equipment, and logistics support in both the Dominican Republic crisis and in UNITAF. Other operations will likely repeat this pattern. The US must be proactive in understanding the support requirements to be undertaken and planning for them. As mentioned in chapter 4, the US should not be surprised by airflow generated by foreign contingents, old or unusual equipment, special food requirements, and unusual fuels. The US should certainly work to include other forces with logistics support capability and encourage units to do as much as possible for themselves. Even the UN itself may one day field a multinational support force. For the foreseeable future, though, the US will continue to provide the lion's share of support for any peace operation it participates in.

Another interoperability concern is training and doctrine. The US is likely to encounter a wide variety in training and doctrine, but American forces should not assume that a small or undeveloped country will send poorly trained troops. Often, small countries go to great lengths to send the best they have. However, such nations can usually only field a few crack troops and subsequent rotations should be evaluated on their own merits. Again, the work of the coalition forces support team in identifying military capabilities and limitations serve as a valuable tool when integrating forces from diverse sources with their corresponding range of abilities.

Intelligence sharing will remain a major issue with multinational operations. We can minimize the problem by using fewer national assets when less sensitive approaches will do. We can also streamline sanitization processes and develop standing practices for coalition environments to take advantage of other nations' resources. Finally, it is clear that in both the Dominican Republic and Somalia that HUMINT was by far the most valuable source of useful intelligence. We must ensure these forces are fielded early and adequately equipped.

The performance of a multilateral operation to perform is also directly related to the ability to integrate culturally and communicate with each other. When deployed in areas of the world like the Caribbean, the Horn of Africa, or the Balkans, such a force also faces language and culture problems with the local population. The best answer is education. We need to strengthen officer corps' language skills and increase the cultural education in our professional schools. Likewise we need to develop quick ways to distribute basic

information in a multilingual environment. Many language problems can be reduced by widespread use of multilingual forms, and simple phrase cards.⁸

The need for translators is obvious, especially between the force and local population. The effort to contract for Somali translators among the émigré population in Washington, D.C., was highly successful. These educated Somalis provided both language and cultural assistance,⁹ but they were also limited. While highly sought after, they usually spoke only Somali and English. The substantial number of the coalition who spoke neither language points out one limit of contracted linguists. Potential security problems are another.¹⁰

No easy answer exists for bridging the linguistic and cultural knowledge gap. More predeployment area-specific training will help with cultural knowledge and should include both information on the host nation and on the contingents they will be working with. Linguists, though, take years to develop. The best solution is to encourage or even require language skills and better tracking of the language abilities inherent in our force. Again we need to recognize that even if English is chosen as the common language, communication will be enhanced by knowledge of other contingents' normal C² language.

While multinational peace enforcement operations are not new, they seem to be more likely in the era of the "new world order." As the world superpower, the US military will be called on to participate. The command and control of such operations present special challenges. If a truly lasting peace is to be enforced and maintained, the force and command structure must be effective, the contingents must be able to function effectively in a highly political environment, and the forces must be able to work as a team. The experiences of the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965-66 and the mission to Somalia have provided laboratories for examining these facets of command and control. By heeding the lessons of these missions we improve our chances in future operations. True peace enforcement though is never a strictly military activity. Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, reflecting on his Dominican Republic experience, offered this advice.

The solution to the problems of a nation do not necessarily lie in defeat of a specific political faction, but may well spring from dealing with the source of the problem—the economy and welfare of the nation and its people. Thus, our military task in stability or national development operations may often be to control opposing factions and bring about an atmosphere of tranquillity and stability.

Notes

1. It should be noted that unlike Somalia, the Dominican Republic intervention began as a strictly unilateral US action. We relied on the Organization of American States to later augment our presence by sending reliable contingents. Although two-thirds of the member states supported the action diplomatically, few actually provided forces.

2. Dr Lawrence A. Yates, *Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966*, Leavenworth Papers, Number 15 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1988); and Maj Gen Anthony C. Zinni, telephone interview, 14 February 1994.
3. Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, Bruce Palmer Papers, oral history, 174.
4. Maj Gen Richard E. Carr, USAF, "Bosnia from the EUCOM Perspective" (Address to Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Coalition Warfare Conference, Norwich University, Northfield, Vt., 24 February 1994); and Ambassador Alexander Borg-Olivier, "The UN in a Changing World Order: Expectations and Realities" (Address to Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Coalition Warfare Conference, Norwich University, Northfield, Vt., 24 February 1994).
5. Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Management," testimony before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Communications of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9 June 1993, 6; and Col Steven R. Rader, USA, *Strengthening the Management of UN Peacekeeping Operations: An Agenda for Reform* (Oslo, Norway: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier (IFS), 1994), 1, 2.
6. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Summary, Operation Restore Hope ARFOR Executive Summary, Tab B, Integration of Coalition Forces," 4, 5; and Attachment 1 ("Coalition Forces Checklist"), 1 March 1993, 1-5.
7. Dr Robert K. Wright, Maj, USAR, telephone interview with author, 6 January 1994.
8. Wright interview.
9. Major Hickson, USA, "Somali Linguist Contracting," JULLS 11535-01115 (00073), 15 January 1993.
10. Maj George Partington, Ghanaian army, pointed out in his December 1994 questionnaire response that the linguists used in UN Cambodian operations served as a intelligence conduit directly to the Khmer Rouge.